1. Jacques Derrida Differance Pdf In Excel
2. Jacques Derrida Differance Pdf In Word

Derrida has developed Deconstruction with the help of his logic of 'Differance'. Diffcrance' means both 'to differ' and 'to defer' and its technical meaning is difference and to delay. We shall also try to show that deconstruction is a critique of logocentrism.

1. A concept introduced by Derrida, differance is a pun on “difference” and “deferment”, and is that attribute of language, by which meaning is generated because of a word’s difference from other words in a signifying system, and at the same time, meaning is inevitably and infinitely deferred or postponed, is constantly under erasure and can be glimpsed only through “aporias” or deadlocks in understanding.
2. May 27, 2016  Jacques Derrida’s “Force of Law” (in “Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice”) is crucial to thinking the nexus between deconstruction and critical legal theory, and is must reading for anybody interested in the critical field.

Jacques Derrida (/ˈdɛrɪdə/; French: [ʒak dɛʁida]; born Jackie Élie Derrida;^[2] July 15, 1930 – October 9, 2004) was an Algerian-born Frenchphilosopher best known for developing a form of semiotic analysis known as deconstruction, which he discussed in numerous texts, and developed in the context of phenomenology.^[3][4][5] He is one of the major figures associated with post-structuralism and postmodern philosophy.^[6][7][8]

During his career Derrida published more than 40 books, together with hundreds of essays and public presentations. He had a significant influence upon the humanities and social sciences, including philosophy, literature, law,^[9][10][11]anthropology,^[12]historiography,^[13]applied linguistics,^[14]sociolinguistics,^[15]psychoanalysis and political theory.

His work retains major academic influence throughout continental Europe, South America and all other countries where continental philosophy has been predominant, particularly in debates around ontology, epistemology (especially concerning social sciences), ethics, aesthetics, hermeneutics, and the philosophy of language. In the Anglosphere, where analytic philosophy is dominant, Derrida's influence is most presently felt in literary studies due to his longstanding interest in language and his association with prominent literary critics from his time at Yale. He also influenced architecture (in the form of deconstructivism), music,^[16]art,^[17] and art criticism.^[18]

Particularly in his later writings, Derrida addressed ethical and political themes in his work. Some critics consider Speech and Phenomena (1967) to be his most important work. Others cite: Of Grammatology (1967), Writing and Difference (1967), and Margins of Philosophy (1972). These writings influenced various activists and political movements.^[19] He became a well-known and influential public figure, while his approach to philosophy and the notorious abstruseness of his work made him controversial.^[19][20]

• 2Philosophy
• 5Peers and contemporaries
• 6Criticism
  • 6.2Criticism from analytic philosophers
• 11Further reading

Life[edit]

Derrida was born on July 15, 1930, in a summer home in El Biar (Algiers), Algeria,^[2] into a SephardicJewish family (originally from Toledo) that became French in 1870 when the Crémieux Decree granted full French citizenship to the indigenous Arabic-speaking Jews of Algeria.^[21] His parents, Haïm Aaron Prosper Charles (Aimé) Derrida (1896–1970)^[22] and Georgette Sultana Esther Safar (1901–1991),^[23][24][25] named him 'Jackie', 'which they considered to be an American name', though he would later adopt a more 'correct' version of his first name when he moved to Paris; some reports indicate that he was named Jackie after the American child actor Jackie Coogan, who had become well-known around the world via his role in the 1921 Charlie Chaplin film The Kid.^[26][27][28] He was also given the middle name Élie after his paternal uncle Eugène Eliahou, at his circumcision; this name was not recorded on his birth certificate unlike those of his siblings, and he would later call it his 'hidden name'.^[29]

Derrida was the third of five children. His elder brother Paul Moïse died at less than three months old, the year before Derrida was born, leading him to suspect throughout his life his role as a replacement for his deceased brother.^[26] Derrida spent his youth in Algiers and in El-Biar.

On the first day of the school year in 1942, French administrators in Algeria —implementing antisemitism quotas set by the Vichy government—expelled Derrida from his lycée. He secretly skipped school for a year rather than attend the Jewish lycée formed by displaced teachers and students, and also took part in numerous football competitions (he dreamed of becoming a professional player). In this adolescent period, Derrida found in the works of philosophers and writers (such as Rousseau, Nietzsche, and Gide) an instrument of revolt against family and society.^[30] His reading also included Camus and Sartre.^[30]

In the late 1940s, he attended the Lycée Bugeaud [fr], in Algiers;^[31] in 1949 he moved to Paris,^[3][20] attending the Lycée Louis-le-Grand,^[31] where his professor of philosophy was Étienne Borne.^[32] At that time he prepared for his entrance exam to the prestigious École Normale Supérieure (ENS); after failing the exam on his first try, he passed it on the second, and was admitted in 1952.^[20] On his first day at ENS, Derrida met Louis Althusser, with whom he became friends. After visiting the Husserl Archive in Leuven, Belgium (1953–1954), he completed his master's degree in philosophy (diplôme d'études supérieures [fr]) on Edmund Husserl (see below). He then passed the highly competitive agrégation exam in 1956. Derrida received a grant for studies at Harvard University, and he spent the 1956–57 academic year reading James Joyce's Ulysses at the Widener Library.^[33] In June 1957, he married the psychoanalyst Marguerite Aucouturier in Boston. During the Algerian War of Independence of 1954–1962, Derrida asked to teach soldiers' children in lieu of military service, teaching French and English from 1957 to 1959.

Following the war, from 1960 to 1964, Derrida taught philosophy at the Sorbonne, where he was an assistant of Suzanne Bachelard (daughter of Gaston), Georges Canguilhem, Paul Ricœur (who in these years coined the term school of suspicion) and Jean Wahl.^[34] His wife, Marguerite, gave birth to their first child, Pierre, in 1963. In 1964, on the recommendation of Louis Althusser and Jean Hyppolite, Derrida got a permanent teaching position at the ENS, which he kept until 1984.^[35][36] In 1965 Derrida began an association with the Tel Quel group of literary and philosophical theorists, which lasted for seven years.^[36] Derrida's subsequent distance from the Tel Quel group, after 1971, has been attributed^{[by whom?]} to his reservations about their embrace of Maoism and of the Chinese Cultural Revolution.^[37]

With 'Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences', his contribution to a 1966 colloquium on structuralism at Johns Hopkins University, his work began to gain international prominence. At the same colloquium Derrida would meet Jacques Lacan and Paul de Man, the latter an important interlocutor in the years to come.^[38] A second son, Jean, was born in 1967. In the same year, Derrida published his first three books—Writing and Difference, Speech and Phenomena, and Of Grammatology.

In 1980, he received his first honorary doctorate (from Columbia University) and was awarded his State doctorate (doctorat d'État) by submitting to the University of Paris ten of his previously published books in conjunction with a defense of his intellectual project under the title 'L'inscription de la philosophie : Recherches sur l'interprétation de l'écriture' ('Inscription in Philosophy: Research on the Interpretation of Writing').^[31][39] The text of Derrida's defense was based on an abandoned draft thesis he had prepared in 1957 under the direction of Jean Hyppolite at the ENS titled 'The Ideality of the Literary Object'^[39] ('L'idéalité de l’objet littéraire');^[40] his 1980 dissertation was subsequently published in English translation as 'The Time of a Thesis: Punctuations'. In 1983 Derrida collaborated with Ken McMullen on the film Ghost Dance. Derrida appears in the film as himself and also contributed to the script.

Derrida traveled widely and held a series of visiting and permanent positions. Derrida became full professor (directeur d'études) at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales in Paris from 1984 (he had been elected at the end of 1983).^[39] With François Châtelet and others he in 1983 co-founded the Collège international de philosophie (CIPH), an institution intended to provide a location for philosophical research which could not be carried out elsewhere in the academia. He was elected as its first president. In 1985 Sylviane Agacinski gave birth to Derrida's third child, Daniel.^[41]

In 1986 Derrida became Professor of the Humanities at the University of California, Irvine, where he taught until shortly before his death in 2004. His papers were filed in the university archives. After Derrida's death, his widow and sons said they wanted copies of UCI's archives shared with the Institute of Contemporary Publishing Archives in France. The university had sued in an attempt to get manuscripts and correspondence from Derrida's widow and children that it believed the philosopher had promised to UC Irvine's collection, although it dropped the suit in 2007.^[42]

Derrida was a regular visiting professor at several other major American and European universities, including Johns Hopkins University, Yale University, New York University, Stony Brook University, and The New School for Social Research.

He was awarded honorary doctorates by the University of Cambridge (1992), Columbia University, The New School for Social Research, the University of Essex, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, the University of Silesia, the University of Coimbra, the University of Athens, and many others around the world.

Derrida's honorary degree at Cambridge was protested by leading philosophers in the analytic tradition. Philosophers including Quine, Marcus, and Armstrong wrote a letter to the university objecting that 'Derrida's work does not meet accepted standards of clarity and rigour,' and 'Academic status based on what seems to us to be little more than semi-intelligible attacks upon the values of reason, truth, and scholarship is not, we submit, sufficient grounds for the awarding of an honorary degree in a distinguished university'.^[43]

Derrida was a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Although his membership in Class IV, Section 1 (Philosophy and Religious Studies) was rejected,^{[citation needed]} he was subsequently elected to Class IV, Section 3 (Literary Criticism, including Philology).^{[citation needed]} He received the 2001 Adorno-Preis from the University of Frankfurt.

Late in his life, Derrida participated in making two biographical documentaries, D'ailleurs, Derrida (Derrida's Elsewhere) by Safaa Fathy (1999),^[44] and Derrida by Kirby Dick and Amy Ziering Kofman (2002).^[45]

Derrida was diagnosed with pancreatic cancer in 2003, which reduced his speaking and travelling engagements.^[46] He died during surgery in a hospital in Paris in the early hours of October 9, 2004.^[47][19]

At the time of his death, Derrida had agreed to go for the summer to Heidelberg as holder of the Gadamer professorship,^[48] whose invitation was expressed by the hermeneutic philosopher himself before his death. Peter Hommelhoff, Rector at Heidelberg by that time, would summarize Derrida's place as: 'Beyond the boundaries of philosophy as an academic discipline he was a leading intellectual figure not only for the humanities but for the cultural perception of a whole age.'^[48]

Philosophy[edit]

Derrida referred to himself as a historian.^[49][50] He questioned assumptions of the Western philosophical tradition and also more broadly Western culture.^[51] By questioning the dominant discourses, and trying to modify them, he attempted to democratize the university scene and to politicize it.^[52] Derrida called his challenge to the assumptions of Western culture 'deconstruction'.^[51] On some occasions, Derrida referred to deconstruction as a radicalization of a certain spirit of Marxism.^[53][54]

With his detailed readings of works from Plato to Rousseau to Heidegger, Derrida frequently argues that Western philosophy has uncritically allowed metaphorical depth models^[jargon] to govern its conception of language and consciousness. He sees these often unacknowledged assumptions as part of a 'metaphysics of presence' to which philosophy has bound itself. This 'logocentrism,' Derrida argues, creates 'marked' or hierarchized binary oppositions that have an effect on everything from our conception of speech's relation to writing to our understanding of racial difference. Deconstruction is an attempt to expose and undermine such 'metaphysics.'

Derrida approaches texts as constructed around binary oppositions which all speech has to articulate if it intends to make any sense whatsoever. This approach to text is, in a broad sense, influenced by the semiology of Ferdinand de Saussure.^[55][56] Saussure, considered to be one of the fathers of structuralism, posited that terms get their meaning in reciprocal determination with other terms inside language.^[57]

Perhaps Derrida's most quoted and famous assertion,^[55] which appears in an essay on Rousseau in his book Of Grammatology (1967),^[58] is the statement that 'there is no out-of-context' (il n'y a pas de hors-texte).^[58] Critics of Derrida have been often accused of having mistranslated the phrase in French to suggest he had written 'Il n'y a rien en dehors du texte' ('There is nothing outside the text') and of having widely disseminated this translation to make it appear that Derrida is suggesting that nothing exists but words.^{[59][60][61][62][63]} Derrida once explained that this assertion 'which for some has become a sort of slogan, in general so badly understood, of deconstruction [...] means nothing else: there is nothing outside context. In this form, which says exactly the same thing, the formula would doubtless have been less shocking.'^[59][64]

Early works[edit]

Derrida began his career examining the limits of phenomenology. His first lengthy academic manuscript, written as a dissertation for his diplôme d'études supérieures and submitted in 1954, concerned the work of Edmund Husserl.^[65] In 1962 he published Edmund Husserl's Origin of Geometry: An Introduction, which contained his own translation of Husserl's essay. Many elements of Derrida's thought were already present in this work. In the interviews collected in Positions (1972), Derrida said: 'In this essay the problematic of writing was already in place as such, bound to the irreducible structure of 'deferral' in its relationships to consciousness, presence, science, history and the history of science, the disappearance or delay of the origin, etc. [...] this essay can be read as the other side (recto or verso, as you wish) of Speech and Phenomena.'^[66]

Derrida first received major attention outside France with his lecture, 'Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences,' delivered at Johns Hopkins University in 1966 (and subsequently included in Writing and Difference). The conference at which this paper was delivered was concerned with structuralism, then at the peak of its influence in France, but only beginning to gain attention in the United States. Derrida differed from other participants by his lack of explicit commitment to structuralism, having already been critical of the movement. He praised the accomplishments of structuralism but also maintained reservations about its internal limitations;^[67] this has led US academics to label his thought as a form of post-structuralism.^[6][7][68]

The effect of Derrida's paper was such that by the time the conference proceedings were published in 1970, the title of the collection had become The Structuralist Controversy. The conference was also where he met Paul de Man, who would be a close friend and source of great controversy, as well as where he first met the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, with whose work Derrida enjoyed a mixed relationship.

Phenomenology vs structuralism debate (1959)[edit]

In the early 1960s, Derrida began speaking and writing publicly, addressing the most topical debates at the time. One of these was the new and increasingly fashionable movement of structuralism, which was being widely favoured as the successor to the phenomenology approach, the latter having been started by Husserl sixty years earlier. Derrida's countercurrent take on the issue, at a prominent international conference, was so influential that it reframed the discussion from a celebration of the triumph of structuralism to a 'phenomenology vs structuralism debate.'

Phenomenology, as envisioned by Husserl, is a method of philosophical inquiry that rejects the rationalist bias that has dominated Western thought since Plato in favor of a method of reflective attentiveness that discloses the individual's 'lived experience;' for those with a more phenomenological bent, the goal was to understand experience by comprehending and describing its genesis, the process of its emergence from an origin or event.^{[citation needed]} For the structuralists, this was a false problem, and the 'depth' of experience could in fact only be an effect of structures which are not themselves experiential.^{[citation needed]}

In that context, in 1959, Derrida asked the question: Must not structure have a genesis, and must not the origin, the point of genesis, be already structured, in order to be the genesis of something?^[69] In other words, every structural or 'synchronic' phenomenon has a history, and the structure cannot be understood without understanding its genesis.^[70] At the same time, in order that there be movement or potential, the origin cannot be some pure unity or simplicity, but must already be articulated—complex—such that from it a 'diachronic' process can emerge. This original complexity must not be understood as an original positing, but more like a default of origin, which Derrida refers to as iterability, inscription, or textuality.^[71] It is this thought of originary complexity that sets Derrida's work in motion, and from which all of its terms are derived, including 'deconstruction'.^[72]

Derrida's method consisted in demonstrating the forms and varieties of this originary complexity, and their multiple consequences in many fields. He achieved this by conducting thorough, careful, sensitive, and yet transformational readings of philosophical and literary texts, to determine what aspects of those texts run counter to their apparent systematicity (structural unity) or intended sense (authorial genesis). By demonstrating the aporias and ellipses of thought, Derrida hoped to show the infinitely subtle ways in which this originary complexity, which by definition cannot ever be completely known, works its structuring and destructuring effects.^[73]

1967–1972[edit]

Derrida's interests crossed disciplinary boundaries, and his knowledge of a wide array of diverse material was reflected in the three collections of work published in 1967: Speech and Phenomena, Of Grammatology (initially submitted as a Doctorat de spécialité thesis under Maurice de Gandillac),^[31] and Writing and Difference.^[74]

On several occasions, Derrida has acknowledged his debt to Husserl and Heidegger, and stated that without them he would not have said a single word.^[75][76] Among the questions asked in these essays are 'What is 'meaning', what are its historical relationships to what is purportedly identified under the rubric 'voice' as a value of presence, presence of the object, presence of meaning to consciousness, self-presence in so called living speech and in self-consciousness?'^[74] In another essay in Writing and Difference entitled 'Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas', the roots of another major theme in Derrida's thought emerges: the Other as opposed to the Same^[77] 'Deconstructive analysis deprives the present of its prestige and exposes it to something tout autre, 'wholly other,' beyond what is foreseeable from the present, beyond the horizon of the 'same'.'^[78] Other than Rousseau, Husserl, Heidegger and Levinas, these three books discussed, and/or relied upon, the works of many philosophers and authors, including linguist Saussure,^[79]Hegel,^[80]Foucault,^[81]Bataille,^[80]Descartes,^[81] anthropologist Lévi-Strauss,^[82][83] paleontologist Leroi-Gourhan,^[84] psychoanalyst Freud,^[85] and writers such as Jabès^[86] and Artaud.^[87]

This collection of three books published in 1967 elaborated Derrida's theoretical framework. Derrida attempts to approach the very heart of the Western intellectual tradition, characterizing this tradition as 'a search for a transcendental being that serves as the origin or guarantor of meaning'. The attempt to 'ground the meaning relations constitutive of the world in an instance that itself lies outside all relationality' was referred to by Heidegger as logocentrism, and Derrida argues that the philosophical enterprise is essentially logocentric,^[88] and that this is a paradigm inherited from Judaism and Hellenism.^[89] He in turn describes logocentrism as phallocratic, patriarchal and masculinist.^[89][90] Derrida contributed to 'the understanding of certain deeply hidden philosophical presuppositions and prejudices in Western culture',^[89] arguing that the whole philosophical tradition rests on arbitrary dichotomous categories (such as sacred/profane, signifier/signified, mind/body), and that any text contains implicit hierarchies, 'by which an order is imposed on reality and by which a subtle repression is exercised, as these hierarchies exclude, subordinate, and hide the various potential meanings.'^[88] Derrida refers to his procedure for uncovering and unsettling these dichotomies as deconstruction of Western culture.^{[citation needed]}

In 1968, he published his influential essay 'Plato's Pharmacy' in the French journal Tel Quel.^[91][92] This essay was later collected in Dissemination, one of three books published by Derrida in 1972, along with the essay collection Margins of Philosophy and the collection of interviews entitled Positions.

1973–1980[edit]

Starting in 1972, Derrida produced on average more than one book per year. Derrida continued to produce important works, such as Glas (1974) and The Post Card: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond (1980).

Derrida received increasing attention in the United States after 1972, where he was a regular visiting professor and lecturer at several major American universities. In the 1980s, during the American culture wars, conservatives started a dispute over Derrida's influence and legacy upon American intellectuals,^[51] and claimed that he influenced American literary critics and theorists more than academic philosophers.^{[88][93][need quotation to verify]}

Of Spirit (1987)[edit]

On March 14, 1987, Derrida presented at the CIPH conference titled 'Heidegger: Open Questions,' a lecture which was published in October 1987 as Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question. It follows the shifting role of Geist (spirit) through Heidegger's work, noting that, in 1927, 'spirit' was one of the philosophical terms that Heidegger set his sights on dismantling.^[94] With his Nazi political engagement in 1933, however, Heidegger came out as a champion of the 'German Spirit,' and only withdrew from an exalting interpretation of the term in 1953. Derrida asks, 'What of this meantime?'^[95] His book connects in a number of respects with his long engagement of Heidegger (such as 'The Ends of Man' in Margins of Philosophy, his Paris seminar on philosophical nationality and nationalism in the mid-1980s, and the essays published in English as Geschlecht and Geschlecht II).^[96] He considers 'four guiding threads' of Heideggerian philosophy that form 'the knot of this Geflecht [braid]': 'the question of the question,' 'the essence of technology,' 'the discourse of animality,' and 'epochality' or 'the hidden teleology or the narrative order.'^[97]

Of Spirit contributes to the long debate on Heidegger's Nazism and appeared at the same time as the French publication of a book by a previously unknown Chilean writer, Victor Farías, who charged that Heidegger's philosophy amounted to a wholehearted endorsement of the NaziSturmabteilung (SA) faction. Derrida responded to Farías in an interview, 'Heidegger, the Philosopher's Hell' and a subsequent article, 'Comment donner raison? How to Concede, with Reasons?' He called Farías a weak reader of Heidegger's thought, adding that much of the evidence Farías and his supporters touted as new had long been known within the philosophical community.^[98]

1990s: political and ethical themes[edit]

Some have argued that Derrida's work took a 'political turn' in the 1990s. Texts cited as evidence of such a turn include Force of Law (1990), as well as Specters of Marx (1994) and Politics of Friendship (1994). Others, however, including Derrida himself, have argued that much of the philosophical work done in his 'political turn' can be dated to earlier essays.^[99] Derrida develops an ethicist view respecting to hospitality, exploring the idea that two types of hospitalities exist, conditional and unconditional. Though this contributed to the works of many scholars, Derrida was seriously criticized for this.^{[100][101][102]}

Those who argue Derrida engaged in an 'ethical turn' refer to works such as The Gift of Death as evidence that he began more directly applying deconstruction to the relationship between ethics and religion. In this work, Derrida interprets passages from the Bible, particularly on Abraham and the Sacrifice of Isaac,^[103][104] and from Søren Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling. Derrida's contemporary readings of Emmanuel Levinas, Walter Benjamin, Carl Schmitt, Jan Patočka, on themes such as law, justice, responsibility, and friendship, had a significant impact on fields beyond philosophy. Derrida and Deconstruction influenced aesthetics, literary criticism, architecture, film theory, anthropology, sociology, historiography, law, psychoanalysis, theology, feminism, gay and lesbian studies and political theory. Jean-Luc Nancy, Richard Rorty, Geoffrey Hartman, Harold Bloom, Rosalind Krauss, Hélène Cixous, Julia Kristeva, Duncan Kennedy, Gary Peller, Drucilla Cornell, Alan Hunt, Hayden White, Mario Kopić, and Alun Munslow are some of the authors who have been influenced by deconstruction.

Derrida delivered a eulogy at Levinas' funeral, later published as Adieu à Emmanuel Lévinas, an appreciation and exploration of Levinas's moral philosophy. Derrida used Bracha L. Ettinger's interpretation of Lévinas' notion of femininity and transformed his own earlier reading of this subject respectively.^[105]

Derrida continued to produce readings of literature, writing extensively on Maurice Blanchot, Paul Celan, and others.

In 1991 he published The Other Heading, in which he discussed the concept of identity (as in cultural identity, European identity, and national identity), in the name of which in Europe have been unleashed 'the worst violences,' 'the crimes of xenophobia, racism, anti-Semitism, religious or nationalist fanaticism.'^[106]

At the 1997 Cerisy Conference, Derrida delivered a ten-hour address on the subject of 'the autobiographical animal,' entitled The Animal That Therefore I Am (More To Follow). Engaging with questions surrounding the ontology of nonhuman animals, the ethics of animal slaughter and the difference between humans and other animals, the address has been seen as initiating a late 'animal turn' in Derrida's philosophy, although Derrida himself has said that his interest in animals is present in his earliest writings.^[107]

The Work of Mourning (1981–2001)[edit]

Beginning with 'The Deaths of Roland Barthes' in 1981, Derrida produced a series of texts on mourning and memory occasioned by the loss of his friends and colleagues, many of them new engagements with their work. Memoires for Paul de Man, a book-length lecture series presented first at Yale and then at Irvine as Derrida's Wellek Lecture, followed in 1986, with a revision in 1989 that included 'Like the Sound of the Sea Deep Within a Shell: Paul de Man's War'. Ultimately, fourteen essays were collected into The Work of Mourning (2001), which was expanded in the 2003 French edition, Chaque fois unique, la fin du monde (literally, 'The end of the world, unique each time'), to include essays dedicated to Gérard Granel and Maurice Blanchot.

2002[edit]

In October 2002, at the theatrical opening of the film Derrida, he said that, in many ways, he felt more and more close to Guy Debord's work, and that this closeness appears in Derrida's texts. Derrida mentioned, in particular, 'everything I say about the media, technology, the spectacle, and the 'criticism of the show', so to speak, and the markets – the becoming-a-spectacle of everything, and the exploitation of the spectacle.'^[108] Among the places in which Derrida mentions the Spectacle, is a 1997 interview about the notion of the intellectual.^[109]

Politics[edit]

Derrida engaged with many political issues, movements, and debates:

• Although Derrida participated in the rallies of the May 1968 protests, and organized the first general assembly at the École Normale Superieure, he said 'I was on my guard, even worried in the face of a certain cult of spontaneity, a fusionist, anti-unionist euphoria, in the face of the enthusiasm of a finally 'freed' speech, of restored 'transparence,' and so forth.'^[110] During May '68, he met frequently with Maurice Blanchot.^[111]
• He registered his objections to the Vietnam War in delivering 'The Ends of Man' in the United States.
• In 1977, he was among the intellectuals, with Foucault and Althusser, who signed the petition against age of consent laws.
• In 1981 Derrida, on the prompting of Roger Scruton and others, founded the French Jan Hus association with structuralist historian Jean-Pierre Vernant. Its purpose was to aid dissident or persecuted Czech intellectuals. Derrida became vice-president.^[112]
• In late 1981 he was arrested by the Czechoslovakian government upon leading a conference in Prague that lacked government authorization, and charged with the 'production and trafficking of drugs', which he claimed were planted as he visited Kafka's grave. He was released (or 'expelled', as the Czechoslovakian government put it) after the interventions of the Mitterrand government, and the assistance of Michel Foucault, returning to Paris on January 1, 1982.^[113]
• He registered his concerns against the proliferation of nuclear weapons in 1984.^[114]
• He was active in cultural activities against the Apartheid government of South Africa and on behalf of Nelson Mandela beginning in 1983.
• He met with Palestinian intellectuals during a 1988 visit to Jerusalem.
• He protested against the death penalty, dedicating his seminar in his last years to the production of a non-utilitarian argument for its abolition, and was active in the campaign to free Mumia Abu-Jamal.
• Derrida was not known to have participated in any conventional electoral political party until 1995, when he joined a committee in support of Lionel Jospin's Socialist candidacy, although he expressed misgivings about such organizations going back to Communist organizational efforts while he was a student at ENS.^{[citation needed]}
• In the 2002 French presidential election he refused to vote in the run-off between far-right candidate Jean-Marie Le Pen and center-right Jacques Chirac, citing a lack of acceptable choices.^[115]
• While supportive of the American government in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, he opposed the 2003 invasion of Iraq (see Rogues and his contribution to Philosophy in a Time of Terror with Giovanna Borradori and Jürgen Habermas).

Beyond these explicit political interventions, however, Derrida was engaged in rethinking politics and the political itself, within and beyond philosophy. Derrida insisted that a distinct political undertone had pervaded his texts from the very beginning of his career. Nevertheless, the attempt to understand the political implications of notions of responsibility, reason of state, the other, decision, sovereignty, Europe, friendship, difference, faith, and so on, became much more marked from the early 1990s on. By 2000, theorizing 'democracy to come,' and thinking the limitations of existing democracies, had become important concerns.

Influences on Derrida[edit]

Crucial readings in his adolescence were Rousseau's Reveries of a Solitary Walker and Confessions, André Gide's journal, La porte étroite, Les nourritures terrestres and The Immoralist;^[30] and the works of Friedrich Nietzsche.^[30] The phrase Families, I hate you! in particular, which inspired Derrida as an adolescent, is a famous verse from Gide's Les nourritures terrestres, book IV.^[116] In a 1991 interview Derrida commented on a similar verse, also from book IV of the same Gide work: 'I hated the homes, the families, all the places where man thinks he'll find rest' (Je haïssais les foyers, les familles, tous lieux où l'homme pense trouver un repos).^[117]

Other influences upon Derrida are Martin Heidegger,^[75][76]Plato, Søren Kierkegaard, Alexandre Kojève, Maurice Blanchot, Antonin Artaud, Roland Barthes, Georges Bataille, Edmund Husserl, Emmanuel Lévinas, Ferdinand de Saussure, Sigmund Freud, Karl Marx, Claude Lévi-Strauss, James Joyce, Samuel Beckett, J. L. Austin^[49] and Stéphane Mallarmé.^[118]

His book, Adieu à Emmanuel Lévinas, reveals his mentorship by this philosopher and Talmudic scholar who practiced the phenomenological encounter with the Other in the form of the Face, which commanded human response.^[119]

Peers and contemporaries[edit]

Derrida's philosophical friends, allies, students and the heirs of Derrida's thought include Paul de Man, Jean-François Lyotard, Michel Foucault, Louis Althusser, Emmanuel Levinas, Maurice Blanchot, Gilles Deleuze, Jean-Luc Nancy, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Sarah Kofman, Hélène Cixous, Bernard Stiegler, Alexander García Düttmann, Joseph Cohen, Geoffrey Bennington, Jean-Luc Marion, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Raphael Zagury-Orly, Jacques Ehrmann, Avital Ronell, Judith Butler, Béatrice Galinon-Mélénec, Ernesto Laclau, Samuel Weber and Catherine Malabou.

Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe[edit]

Jean-Luc Nancy and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe were among Derrida's first students in France and went on to become well-known and important philosophers in their own right. Despite their considerable differences of subject, and often also of a method, they continued their close interaction with each other and with Derrida, from the early 1970s.

Derrida wrote on both of them, including a long book on Nancy: Le Toucher, Jean-Luc Nancy (On Touching—Jean-Luc Nancy, 2005).

Paul de Man[edit]

Derrida's most prominent friendship in intellectual life was with Paul de Man, which began with their meeting at Johns Hopkins University and continued until de Man's death in 1983. De Man provided a somewhat different approach to deconstruction, and his readings of literary and philosophical texts were crucial in the training of a generation of readers.

Shortly after de Man's death, Derrida wrote the book Memoires: pour Paul de Man and in 1988 wrote an article in the journal Critical Inquiry called 'Like the Sound of the Sea Deep Within a Shell: Paul de Man's War'. The memoir became cause for controversy, because shortly before Derrida published his piece, it had been discovered by the Belgian literary critic Ortwin de Graef that long before his academic career in the US, de Man had written almost two hundred essays in a pro-Nazi newspaper during the German occupation of Belgium, including several that were explicitly antisemitic.

Derrida complicated the notion that it is possible to simply read de Man's later scholarship through the prism of these earlier political essays. Rather, any claims about de Man's work should be understood in relation to the entire body of his scholarship. Critics of Derrida have argued that he minimizes the antisemitic character of de Man's writing. Some critics have found Derrida's treatment of this issue surprising, given that, for example, Derrida also spoke out against antisemitism and, in the 1960s, broke with the Heidegger disciple Jean Beaufret over Beaufret's instances of antisemitism, about which Derrida (and, after him, Maurice Blanchot) expressed shock.

Michel Foucault[edit]

Derrida's criticism of Foucault appears in the essay Cogito and the History of Madness (from Writing and Difference). It was first given as a lecture on March 4, 1963, at a conference at Wahl's Collège philosophique, which Foucault attended, and caused a rift between the two men that was never fully mended.^[35]

In an appendix added to the 1972 edition of his History of Madness, Foucault disputed Derrida's interpretation of his work, and accused Derrida of practicing 'a historically well-determined little pedagogy [...] which teaches the student that there is nothing outside the text [...]. A pedagogy which inversely gives to the voice of the masters that infinite sovereignty that allows it indefinitely to re-say the text.'^[120] According to historian Carlo Ginzburg, Foucault may have written The Order of Things (1966) and The Archaeology of Knowledge partly under the stimulus of Derrida's criticism.^[121] Carlo Ginzburg briefly labeled Derrida's criticism in Cogito and the History of Madness, as 'facile, nihilistic objections,' without giving further argumentation.^[121]

Derrida's translators[edit]

Geoffrey Bennington, Avital Ronell and Samuel Weber belong to a group of Derrida translators. Many of Derrida's translators are esteemed thinkers in their own right. Derrida often worked in a collaborative arrangement, allowing his prolific output to be translated into English in a timely fashion.

Having started as a student of de Man, Gayatri Spivak took on the translation of Of Grammatology early in her career and has since revised it into a second edition. Barbara Johnson's translation of Derrida's Dissemination was published by The Athlone Press in 1981. Alan Bass was responsible for several early translations; Bennington and Peggy Kamuf have continued to produce translations of his work for nearly twenty years. In recent years, a number of translations have appeared by Michael Naas (also a Derrida scholar) and Pascale-Anne Brault.

Bennington, Brault, Kamuf, Naas, Elizabeth Rottenberg, and David Wills are currently engaged in translating Derrida's previously unpublished seminars, which span from 1959 to 2003.^[122] Volumes I and II of The Beast and the Sovereign (presenting Derrida's seminars from December 12, 2001 to March 27, 2002 and from December 11, 2002 to March 26, 2003), as well as The Death Penalty, Volume I (covering December 8, 1999 to March 22, 2000), have appeared in English translation. Further volumes currently projected for the series include Heidegger: The Question of Being and History (1964-1965), Death Penalty, Volume II (2000–2001), Perjury and Pardon, Volume I (1997–1998), and Perjury and Pardon, Volume II (1998–1999).^[123]

With Bennington, Derrida undertook the challenge published as Jacques Derrida, an arrangement in which Bennington attempted to provide a systematic explication of Derrida's work (called the 'Derridabase') using the top two-thirds of every page, while Derrida was given the finished copy of every Bennington chapter and the bottom third of every page in which to show how deconstruction exceeded Bennington's account (this was called the 'Circumfession'). Derrida seems to have viewed Bennington in particular as a kind of rabbinical explicator, noting at the end of the 'Applied Derrida' conference, held at the University of Luton in 1995 that: 'everything has been said and, as usual, Geoff Bennington has said everything before I have even opened my mouth. I have the challenge of trying to be unpredictable after him, which is impossible... so I'll try to pretend to be unpredictable after Geoff. Once again.'^[124]

Marshall McLuhan[edit]

Derrida was familiar with the work of Marshall McLuhan, and since his early 1967 writings (Of Grammatology, Speech and Phenomena), he speaks of language as a 'medium,'^[125] of phonetic writing as 'the medium of the great metaphysical, scientific, technical, and economic adventure of the West.'^[126]

He expressed his disagreement with McLuhan in regard to what Derrida called McLuhan's ideology about the end of writing.^[127] In a 1982 interview, he said:

I think that there is an ideology in McLuhan's discourse that I don't agree with because he's an optimist as to the possibility of restoring an oral community which would get rid of the writing machines and so on. I think that's a very traditional myth which goes back to... let's say Plato, Rousseau... And instead of thinking that we are living at the end of writing, I think that in another sense we are living in the extension – the overwhelming extension – of writing. At least in the new sense... I don't mean the alphabetic writing down, but in the new sense of those writing machines that we're using now (e.g. the tape recorder). And this is writing too.^[128]

And in his 1972 essay Signature Event Context he said:

As writing, communication, if one insists upon maintaining the word, is not the means of transport of sense, the exchange of intentions and meanings, the discourse and 'communication of consciousnesses.' We are not witnessing an end of writing which, to follow McLuhan's ideological representation, would restore a transparency or immediacy of social relations; but indeed a more and more powerful historical unfolding of a general writing of which the system of speech, consciousness, meaning, presence, truth, etc., would only be an effect, to be analyzed as such. It is this questioned effect that I have elsewhere called logocentrism.^[129]

Architectural thinkers[edit]

Derrida had a direct impact on the theories and practices of influential architects Peter Eisenman and Bernard Tschumi towards the end of the twentieth century. Derrida impacted a project that was theorized by Eisenman in Chora L Works: Jacques Derrida and Peter Eisenman.^[130] This design was architecturally conceived by Tschumi for the Parc de la Villette in Paris, which included a sieve, or harp-like structure that Derrida envisaged as a physical metaphor for the receptacle-like properties of the khôra. Moreover, Derrida's commentaries on Plato's notion of khôra (χώρα) as set in the Timaeus (48e4) received later reflections in the philosophical works and architectural writings of the philosopher-architect Nader El-Bizri within the domain of phenomenology.

Derrida used 'χώρα' to name a radical otherness that 'gives place' for being. El-Bizri built on this by more narrowly taking khôra to name the radical happening of an ontological difference between being and beings.^[131] El-Bizri's reflections on 'khôra' are taken as a basis for tackling the meditations on dwelling and on being and space in Heidegger's thought and the critical conceptions of space and place as they evolved in architectural theory (and its strands in phenomenological thinking),^[132] and in history of philosophy and science, with a focus on geometry and optics.^[133] This also describes El-Bizri's take on 'econtology' as an extension of Heidegger's consideration of the question of being (Seinsfrage) by way of the fourfold (Das Geviert) of earth-sky-mortals-divinities (Erde und Himmel, Sterblichen und Göttlichen); and as also impacted by his own meditations on Derrida's take on 'χώρα'. Ecology is hence co-entangled with ontology, whereby the worldly existential analytics are grounded in earthiness, and environmentalism is orientated by ontological thinking^[134]Derrida argued that the subjectile is like Plato's khôra, Greek for space, receptacle or site. Plato proposes that khôra rests between the sensible and the intelligible, through which everything passes but in which nothing is retained. For example, an image needs to be held by something, just as a mirror will hold a reflection. For Derrida, khôra defies attempts at naming or the either/or logic, which he 'deconstructed'.

Criticism[edit]

Criticism from Marxists[edit]

In a paper entitled Ghostwriting,^[135]Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak—the translator of Derrida's De la grammatologie (Of Grammatology) into English—criticised Derrida's understanding of Marx.^[136] Commenting on Derrida's Specters of Marx, Terry Eagleton wrote 'The portentousness is ingrained in the very letter of this book, as one theatrically inflected rhetorical question tumbles hard on the heels of another in a tiresomely mannered syntax which lays itself wide open to parody.'^[137]

Criticism from analytic philosophers[edit]

Though Derrida addressed the American Philosophical Association on at least one occasion in 1988,^[138] and was highly regarded by some contemporary philosophers like Richard Rorty, Alexander Nehamas,^[139] and Stanley Cavell, his work has been regarded by other analytic philosophers, such as John Searle and Willard Van Orman Quine,^[140] as pseudophilosophy or sophistry.

Jacques Derrida Differance Pdf In Excel

Some analytic philosophers have in fact claimed, since at least the 1980s, that Derrida's work is 'not philosophy.' One of the main arguments they gave was alleging that Derrida's influence had not been on US philosophy departments but on literature and other humanities disciplines.^[88][93]

In his 1989 Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, Richard Rorty argues that Derrida (especially in his book, The Post Card: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond, one section of which is an experiment in fiction) purposefully uses words that cannot be defined (e.g., différance), and uses previously definable words in contexts diverse enough to make understanding impossible, so that the reader will never be able to contextualize Derrida's literary self. Rorty, however, argues that this intentional obfuscation is philosophically grounded. In garbling his message Derrida is attempting to escape the naïve, positive metaphysical projects of his predecessors.^[141]

Philosopher Sir Roger Scruton wrote in 2004, 'He's difficult to summarise because it's nonsense. He argues that the meaning of a sign is never revealed in the sign but deferred indefinitely and that a sign only means something by virtue of its difference from something else. For Derrida, there is no such thing as meaning – it always eludes us and therefore anything goes.'^[142]

On Derrida's scholarship and writing style, Noam Chomsky wrote 'I found the scholarship appalling, based on pathetic misreading; and the argument, such as it was, failed to come close to the kinds of standards I've been familiar with since virtually childhood. Well, maybe I missed something: could be, but suspicions remain, as noted.'^[143]

Paul R. Gross and Norman Levitt also criticized his work for misusing scientific terms and concepts in Higher Superstition: The Academic Left and Its Quarrels With Science (1994).^[144]

Three quarrels (or disputes) in particular went out of academic circles and received international mass media coverage: the 1972–88 quarrel with John Searle, the analytic philosophers' pressures on Cambridge University not to award Derrida an honorary degree, and a dispute with Richard Wolin and the NYRB.

Searle–Derrida debate[edit]

In the early 1970s, Searle had a brief exchange with Jacques Derrida regarding speech-act theory. The exchange was characterized by a degree of mutual hostility between the philosophers, each of whom accused the other of having misunderstood his basic points.^{[145][citation needed]} Searle was particularly hostile to Derrida's deconstructionist framework and much later refused to let his response to Derrida be printed along with Derrida's papers in the 1988 collection Limited Inc. Searle did not consider Derrida's approach to be legitimate philosophy or even intelligible writing and argued that he did not want to legitimize the deconstructionist point of view by dedicating any attention to it. Consequently, some critics^[146] have considered the exchange to be a series of elaborate misunderstandings rather than a debate, while others^[147] have seen either Derrida or Searle gaining the upper hand. The level of hostility can be seen from Searle's statement that 'It would be a mistake to regard Derrida's discussion of Austin as a confrontation between two prominent philosophical traditions', to which Derrida replied that that sentence was 'the only sentence of the 'reply' to which I can subscribe'.^[148] Commentators have frequently interpreted the exchange as a prominent example of a confrontation between analytical and continental philosophy.

The debate began in 1972, when, in his paper 'Signature Event Context', Derrida analyzed J. L. Austin's theory of the illocutionary act. While sympathetic to Austin's departure from a purely denotational account of language to one that includes 'force', Derrida was sceptical of the framework of normativity employed by Austin. He argued that Austin had missed the fact that any speech event is framed by a 'structure of absence' (the words that are left unsaid due to contextual constraints) and by 'iterability' (the constraints on what can be said, given by what has been said in the past). Derrida argued that the focus on intentionality in speech-act theory was misguided because intentionality is restricted to that which is already established as a possible intention. He also took issue with the way Austin had excluded the study of fiction, non-serious or 'parasitic' speech, wondering whether this exclusion was because Austin had considered these speech genres governed by different structures of meaning, or simply due to a lack of interest. In his brief reply to Derrida, 'Reiterating the Differences: A Reply to Derrida', Searle argued that Derrida's critique was unwarranted because it assumed that Austin's theory attempted to give a full account of language and meaning when its aim was much narrower. Searle considered the omission of parasitic discourse forms to be justified by the narrow scope of Austin's inquiry.^[149][150] Searle agreed with Derrida's proposal that intentionality presupposes iterability, but did not apply the same concept of intentionality used by Derrida, being unable or unwilling to engage with the continental conceptual apparatus.^[147] This, in turn, caused Derrida to criticize Searle for not being sufficiently familiar with phenomenological perspectives on intentionality.^[151] Searle also argued that Derrida's disagreement with Austin turned on his having misunderstood Austin's type–token distinction and his failure to understand Austin's concept of failure in relation to performativity. Some critics^[151] have suggested that Searle, by being so grounded in the analytical tradition that he was unable to engage with Derrida's continental phenomenological tradition, was at fault for the unsuccessful nature of the exchange.

The substance of Searle's criticism of Derrida in relation to topics in the philosophy of language—referenced in Derrida's Signature Event Context—was that Derrida had no apparent familiarity with contemporary philosophy of language nor of contemporary linguistics in Anglo-Saxon countries. Searle explains, 'When Derrida writes about the philosophy of language he refers typically to Rousseau and Condillac, not to mention Plato. And his idea of a 'modern linguist' is Benveniste or even Saussure.'^[152] Searle describes Derrida's philosophical knowledge as pre-Wittgensteinian—that is to say, disconnected from analytic tradition—and consequently, in his perspective, naive and misguided, concerned with issues long-since resolved or otherwise found to be non-issues.^[152]

Searle also wrote in The New York Review of Books that he was surprised by 'the low level of philosophical argumentation, the deliberate obscurantism of the prose, the wildly exaggerated claims, and the constant striving to give the appearance of profundity by making claims that seem paradoxical, but under analysis often turn out to be silly or trivial.'^[153]

Derrida, in his response to Searle ('a b c ...' in Limited Inc), ridiculed Searle's positions. Claiming that a clear sender of Searle's message could not be established, he suggested that Searle had formed with Austin a société à responsabilité limitée (a 'limited liability company') due to the ways in which the ambiguities of authorship within Searle's reply circumvented the very speech act of his reply. Searle did not reply. Later in 1988, Derrida tried to review his position and his critiques of Austin and Searle, reiterating that he found the constant appeal to 'normality' in the analytical tradition to be problematic from which they were only paradigmatic examples.^{[147][154][155][156][157][158][159][160]}

In the description of the structure called 'normal,' 'normative,' 'central,' 'ideal,' this possibility must be integrated as an essential possibility. The possibility cannot be treated as though it were a simple accident-marginal or parasitic. It cannot be, and hence ought not to be, and this passage from can to ought reflects the entire difficulty. In the analysis of so-called normal cases, one neither can nor ought, in all theoretical rigor, to exclude the possibility of transgression. Not even provisionally, or out of allegedly methodological considerations. It would be a poor method, since this possibility of transgression tells us immediately and indispensable about the structure of the act said to be normal as well as about the structure of law in general.

He continued arguing how problematic was establishing the relation between 'nonfiction or standard discourse' and 'fiction,' defined as its 'parasite', 'for part of the most original essence of the latter is to allow fiction, the simulacrum, parasitism, to take place-and in so doing to 'de-essentialize' itself as it were'.^[154] He would finally argue that the indispensable question would then become:^[154]

what is 'nonfiction standard discourse,' what must it be and what does this name evoke, once its fictionality or its fictionalization, its transgressive 'parasitism,' is always possible (and moreover by virtue of the very same words, the same phrases, the same grammar, etc.)? This question is all the more indispensable since the rules, and even the statements of the rules governing the relations of 'nonfiction standard discourse' and its fictional 'parasites,' are not things found in nature, but laws, symbolic inventions, or conventions, institutions that, in their very normality as well as in their normativity, entail something of the fictional.

In the debate, Derrida praises Austin's work but argues that he is wrong to banish what Austin calls 'infelicities' from the 'normal' operation of language. One 'infelicity,' for instance, occurs when it cannot be known whether a given speech act is 'sincere' or 'merely citational' (and therefore possibly ironic, etc.). Derrida argues that every iteration is necessarily 'citational,' due to the graphematic nature of speech and writing, and that language could not work at all without the ever-present and ineradicable possibility of such alternate readings. Derrida takes Searle to task for his attempt to get around this issue by grounding final authority in the speaker's inaccessible 'intention'. Derrida argues that intention cannot possibly govern how an iteration signifies, once it becomes hearable or readable.^{[citation needed]} All speech acts borrow a language whose significance is determined by historical-linguistic context, and by the alternate possibilities that this context makes possible. This significance, Derrida argues, cannot be altered or governed by the whims of intention.

In 1994, Searle argued that the ideas upon which deconstruction is founded are essentially a consequence of a series of conceptual confusions made by Derrida as a result of his outdated knowledge or are merely banalities. He insisted that Derrida's conception of iterability and its alleged 'corrupting' effect on meaning stems from Derrida's ignorance of the type–token distinction that exists in current linguistics and philosophy of language. As Searle explains, 'Most importantly, from the fact that different tokens of a sentence type can be uttered on different occasions with different intentions, that is, different speaker meanings, nothing of any significance follows about the original speaker meaning of the original utterance token.'^[152]

In 1995, Searle gave a brief reply to Derrida in The Construction of Social Reality. He called Derrida's conclusion 'preposterous' and stated that 'Derrida, as far as I can tell, does not have an argument. He simply declares that there is nothing outside of texts...'^[161] Searle's reference here is not to anything forwarded in the debate, but to a mistranslation of the phrase 'il n'y a pas de hors-texte' ('there is no outside-text'), which appears in Derrida's Of Grammatology.^[162]

According to Searle, the consistent pattern of Derrida's rhetoric is:
(a) announce a preposterous thesis, e.g. 'there is no outside-text' (il n'y a pas de hors-texte);
(b) when challenged on (a) respond that you have been misunderstood and revise the claim in (a) such that it becomes a truism, e.g. 'il n'y a pas de hors-texte' means nothing else: there is nothing outside contexts';^[163]
(c) when the reformulation from (b) is acknowledged then proceed as if the original formulation from (a) was accepted. The revised idea—for example that everything exists in some context—is a banality but a charade ensues as if the original claim—nothing exists outside of text [sic]—had been established.

Cambridge honorary doctorate[edit]

In 1992 some academics at Cambridge University, mostly not from the philosophy faculty, proposed that Derrida be awarded an honorary doctorate. This was opposed by, among others, the university's Professor of Philosophy David Mellor. Eighteen other philosophers from US, Austrian, Australian, French, Polish, Italian, German, Dutch, Swiss, Spanish, and UK institutions, including Barry Smith, Willard Van Orman Quine, David Armstrong, Ruth Barcan Marcus, and René Thom, then sent a letter to Cambridge claiming that Derrida's work 'does not meet accepted standards of clarity and rigour' and describing Derrida's philosophy as being composed of 'tricks and gimmicks similar to those of the Dadaists.' The letter concluded that:

... where coherent assertions are being made at all, these are either false or trivial. Academic status based on what seems to us to be little more than semi-intelligible attacks upon the values of reason, truth, and scholarship is not, we submit, sufficient grounds for the awarding of an honorary degree in a distinguished university.^[164]

In the end the protesters were outnumbered—336 votes to 204—when Cambridge put the motion to a vote;^[165] though almost all of those who proposed Derrida and who voted in favour were not from the philosophy faculty.^[166] Derrida suggested in an interview that part of the reason for the attacks on his work was that it questioned and modified 'the rules of the dominant discourse, it tries to politicize and democratize education and the university scene.' To answer a question about the 'exceptional violence,' the compulsive 'ferocity,' and the 'exaggeration' of the 'attacks,' he would say that these critics organize and practice in his case 'a sort of obsessive personality cult which philosophers should know how to question and above all to moderate'.^[167]

Dispute with Richard Wolin and the NYRB[edit]

Richard Wolin has argued since 1991 that Derrida's work, as well as that of Derrida's major inspirations (e.g., Bataille, Blanchot, Levinas, Heidegger, Nietzsche), leads to a corrosive nihilism. For example, Wolin argues that the 'deconstructive gesture of overturning and reinscription ends up by threatening to efface many of the essential differences between Nazism and non-Nazism'.^[168]

In 1991, when Wolin published a Derrida interview on Heidegger in the first edition of The Heidegger Controversy, Derrida argued that the interview was an intentionally malicious mistranslation, which was 'demonstrably execrable' and 'weak, simplistic, and compulsively aggressive'. As French law requires the consent of an author to translations and this consent was not given, Derrida insisted that the interview not appear in any subsequent editions or reprints. Columbia University Press subsequently refused to offer reprints or new editions. Later editions of The Heidegger Controversy by MIT Press also omitted the Derrida interview. The matter achieved public exposure owing to a friendly review of Wolin's book by the Heideggerian scholar Thomas Sheehan that appeared in The New York Review of Books, in which Sheehan characterised Derrida's protests as an imposition of censorship. It was followed by an exchange of letters.^[169] Derrida in turn responded to Sheehan and Wolin, in 'The Work of Intellectuals and the Press (The Bad Example: How the New York Review of Books and Company do Business)', which was published in the book Points....^[170]

Twenty-four academics, belonging to different schools and groups – often in disagreement with each other and with deconstruction – signed a letter addressed to The New York Review of Books, in which they expressed their indignation for the magazine's behaviour as well as that of Sheenan and Wolin.^[171]

Critical obituaries[edit]

Critical obituaries of Derrida were published in The New York Times,^[19]The Economist,^[172] and The Independent.^[173] The magazine The Nation responded to the New York Times obituary saying that 'even though American papers had scorned and trivialized Derrida before, the tone seemed particularly caustic for an obituary of an internationally acclaimed philosopher who had profoundly influenced two generations of American humanities scholars.'^[51][174]

Works by Derrida[edit]

See also[edit]

Notes[edit]

1. ^John D. Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics: Repetition, Deconstruction, and the Hermeneutic Project, OCLC729013297, Indiana University Press, 1988, p. 5: 'Derrida is the turning point for radical hermeneutics, the point where hermeneutics is pushed to the brink. Radical hermeneutics situates itself in the space which is opened up by the exchange between Heidegger and Derrida...'
2. ^ ^abPeeters, Benoît (2012). Derrida: A Biography. Polity. pp. 12–13. Jackie was born at daybreak, on 15 July 1930, at El Biar, in the hilly suburbs of Algiers, in a holiday home. [...] The boy's main forename was probably chosen because of Jackie Coogan ... When he was circumcised, he was given a second forename, Elie, which was not entered on his birth certificate, unlike the equivalent names of his brother and sister.OCLC980688411, 844437566, 818721033 See also Bennington, Geoffrey (1993). Jacques Derrida. The University of Chicago Press. p. 325. 1930 Birth of Jackie Derrida, July 15, in El-Biar (near Algiers, in a holiday house)..
3. ^ ^ab'Jacques Derrida'. Encyclopaedia Britannica. Britannica.com. Retrieved 19 May 2017.
4. ^Derrida on Religion: Thinker of Differance By Dawne McCance. Equinox. p. 7.
5. ^Derrida, Deconstruction, and the Politics of Pedagogy (Counterpoints Studies in the Postmodern Theory of Education). Peter Lang Publishing Inc. p. 134.OCLC314727596, 476972726, 263497930, 783449163
6. ^ ^abBensmaïa, Réda, 'Poststructuralism', in Kritzman (2005), pp. 92–93.
7. ^ ^abPoster (1988), pp. 5–6.
8. ^Vincent B. Leitch Postmodernism: Local Effects, Global Flows, SUNY Series in Postmodern Culture (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1996), p. 27.
9. ^Derrida, Jacques (1992). 'Force of Law'. Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice. translated by Mary Quaintance, eds., Drucilla Cornell, Michael Rosenfeld, and David Gray Carlson (1st ed.). New York: Routledge. pp. 3–67. ISBN978-0810103979. 'A decision that did not go through the ordeal of the undecidable would not be a free decision, it would only be the programmable application or unfolding of a calculable process (...) deconstructs from the inside every assurance of presence, and thus every criteriology that would assure us of the justice of the decision.
10. ^'Critical Legal Studies Movement' in 'The Bridge'
11. ^GERMAN LAW JOURNAL, SPECIAL ISSUE: A DEDICATION TO JACQUES DERRIDAArchived May 16, 2013, at the Wayback Machine, Vol. 6 No. 1, 1-243, 1 January 2005
12. ^'Legacies of Derrida: Anthropology', Rosalind C. Morris, Annual Review of Anthropology, Volume: 36, pages: 355–389, 2007
13. ^'Deconstructing History', published 1997, (2nd. Edn. Routledge, 2006)
14. ^Busch, Brigitt (2012). 'Linguistic Repertoire Revisited'. Applied Linguistics. 33 (5): 503–523. doi:10.1093/applin/ams056.
15. ^'The sociolinguistics of schooling: the relevance of Derrida's Monolingualism of the Other or the Prosthesis of Origin', Michael Evans, 01/2012; ISBN978-3-0343-1009-3 In book: The Sociolinguistics of Language Education in International Contexts, Publisher: Peter Lang, Editors: Edith Esch and Martin Solly, pp. 31–46
16. ^'Deconstruction in Music – The Jacques Derrida', Gerd Zacher Encounter, Rotterdam, The Netherlands, 2002
17. ^E.g., 'Doris Salcedo', Phaidon (2004), 'Hans Haacke', Phaidon (2000)
18. ^E.g. 'The return of the real', Hal Foster, October – MIT Press (1996); 'Kant after Duchamp', Thierry de Duve, October – MIT Press (1996); 'Neo-Avantgarde and Cultural Industry - Essays on European and American Art from 1955 to 1975', Benjamin H.D. Buchloh, October - MIT Press (2000); 'Perpetual Inventory', Rosalind E. Krauss, October - MIT Press, 2010
19. ^ ^abcdKandell, Jonathan (October 10, 2004). 'Jacques Derrida, Abstruse Theorist, Dies at 74'. The New York Times.
20. ^ ^abcLawlor, Leonard. 'Jacques Derrida'. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. plato.stanford.edu. November 22, 2006; last modified October 6, 2016. Retrieved 20 May 2017.
21. ^'I took part in the extraordinary transformation of the Algerian Jews; my great-grandparents were by language, custom, etc., still identified with Arabic culture. After the Cremieux Decree (1870), at the end of the 19th c., the following generation became bourgeois', Jacques Derrida The Last InterviewArchived March 5, 2009, at the Wayback Machine, May 2003.
22. ^'Haim, Aaron, Prosper, Charles, Aimé Aimé, Mémé - Arbre Familial des Zaffran (Zafran et Safran), Miguéres, Gharbi, Allouche, Safar, Temime etc... - GeneaNet'. Gw4.geneanet.org. January 18, 2012. Retrieved October 21, 2012.
23. ^ Georgette, Sultana, Esther SAFAR (January 18, 2012). 'Georgette, Sultana, Esther SAFAR - Arbre Familial des Zaffran (Zafran et Safran), Miguéres, Gharbi, Allouche, Safar, Temime etc... - GeneaNet'. Gw4.geneanet.org. Retrieved October 21, 2012.CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
24. ^Bennington (1991), p. 325
25. ^'Safar surname: occupational name from Arabic saffar which means worker in copper or brass', The Safar surname'
26. ^ ^abPowell (2006), p. 12.
27. ^Obituary in The Guardian, accessed August 2, 2007.
28. ^Cixous (2001), p. vii; also see this interview with Derrida's long-term collaborator John CaputoArchived 2005-05-24 at the Wayback Machine.
29. ^Peeters, Benoît (2012). Derrida: A Biography. Polity. p. 13. When he was circumcised, he was given a second forename, Elie, which was not entered on his birth certificate, unlike the equivalent names of his brother and sister. See also Derrida, Jacques (1993). 'Circumfession'. Jacques Derrida. The University of Chicago Press. p. 96. 'So I have borne, without bearing, without its ever being written (12-23-76)' the name of the prophet Élie, Elijah in English ... so I took myself toward the hidden name without its ever being written on the official records, the same name as that of the paternal uncle Eugène Eliahou Derrida ...
30. ^ ^abcdDerrida (1989) This Strange Institution Called Literature, pp. 35, 38–9
31. ^ ^abcdAlan D. Schrift (2006), Twentieth-Century French Philosophy: Key Themes And Thinkers, Blackwell Publishing, p. 120.
32. ^Marc Goldschmidt, Jacques Derrida : une introduction, 2003, p. 231.
33. ^Caputo (1997), p. 25.
34. ^Bennington (1991), p. 330
35. ^ ^abPowell (2006) pp. 34–5
36. ^ ^abPowell (2006), p. 58
37. ^Leslie Hill, The Cambridge Introduction to Jacques Derrida, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 55.
38. ^Jacques Derrida and Geoffrey Bennington, Jacques Derrida, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994, p. 331
39. ^ ^abcPowell (2006), p. 145.
40. ^Jacques Derrida - Editions de Minuit
41. ^'Obituary: Jacques Derrida', by Derek Attridge and Thomas Baldwin, The Guardian, October 11, 2004. Retrieved January 19, 2010.
42. ^UC Irvine drops suit over Derrida's personal papersArchived May 20, 2012, at the Wayback Machine
43. ^'The Letter against Derrida's Honorary Degree, re-examined'. Retrieved September 3, 2018.
44. ^IMDb
45. ^IMDb
46. ^philosophybasics.com
47. ^Jacques Derrida Dies; Deconstructionist Philosopher, accessed May 9, 2012.
48. ^ ^ab'The University of Heidelberg Mourns the Death of Jacques Derrida'
49. ^ ^abDerrida (1988) Afterword, pp. 130–1
50. ^Derrida (1989) This Strange Institution Called Literature, p. 54:

    Contrary to what some people believe or have an interest in making believe, I consider myself very much a historian, very historicist [...] Deconstruction calls for a highly 'historian's' attitude (Of Grammatology, for example, is a history book through and through).

51. ^ ^abcdRoss Benjamin Hostile Obituary for Derrida, The Nation, November 24, 2004
52. ^Derrida (1992) Cambridge Review, pp. 404, 408–13.
53. ^Derrida (1976) Where a Teaching Body Begins, English translation 2002, p. 72
54. ^Derrida, Jacques (1993). 'Spectres of Marx' (in French): 92.Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
55. ^ ^abRoyle, Nicholas (2004), Jacques Derrida, pp. 62–63
56. ^Derrida and Ferraris (1997), p. 76:

    I take great interest in questions of language and rhetoric, and I think they deserve enormous consideration, but there is a point where the authority of final jurisdiction is neither rhetorical nor linguistic, nor even discursive. The notion of trace or of text is introduced to mark the limits of the linguistic turn. This is one more reason why I prefer to speak of 'mark' rather than of language. In the first place, the mark is not anthropological; it is prelinguistic; it is the possibility of language, and it is everywhere there is a relation to another thing or relation to another. For such relations, the mark has no need of language.

57. ^Saussure, Ferdinand de (1916 [trans. 1959]). Course in General Linguistics. New York: New York Philosophical Library. pp. 121–22.Check date values in: |year= (help)

    In language there are only differences. Even more important: a difference generally implies positive terms between which the difference is set up; but in language, there are only differences without positive terms. Whether we take the signified or the signifier, language has neither ideas nor sounds that existed before the linguistic system, but only conceptual and phonic differences that have issued from the system. The idea or phonic substance that a sign contains is of less importance than the other signs that surround it. [...] A linguistic system is a series of differences of sound combined with a series of differences of ideas; but the pairing of a certain number of acoustical signs with as many cuts made from the mass thought engenders a system of values.

58. ^ ^abDerrida (1967) Of Grammatology, Part II Introduction to the 'Age of Rousseau,' section 2 '...That Dangerous Supplement...', title The Exorbitant. Question of Method, pp. 158–59, 163
59. ^ ^abDerrida (1988) Afterword, p. 136
60. ^Reilly, Brian J. (2005) Jacques Derrida, in Kritzman (2005), p. 500.
61. ^Coward, Harold G. (1990) Derrida and Indian philosophy, pp. 83, 137
62. ^Pidgen, Charles R. (1990) On a Defence of Derrida, in The Critical review (1990) Issues 30–32, pp. 40–41
63. ^Sullivan, Patricia (2004) Jacques Derrida Dies; Deconstructionist Philosopher, in Washington Post, October 10, 2004, p. C11, accessed August 2, 2007.
64. ^Glendinning, Simon (2011). Jacques Derrida: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press.
65. ^The dissertation was eventually published in 1990 with the title Le problème de la genèse dans la philosophie de Husserl. English translation: The Problem of Genesis in Husserl's Philosophy (2003).
66. ^J. Derrida (1967), interview with Henri Ronse, p. 5.
67. ^Jacques Derrida, 'Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences,' in Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), p. 278.
68. ^

    (...) the entire history of the concept of structure, before the rupture of which we are speaking, must be thought of as a series of substitutions of centre for centre, as a linked chain of determinations of the centre. Successively, and in a regulated fashion, the centre receives different forms or names. The history of metaphysics, like the history of the West, is the history of these metaphors and metonymies. Its matrix [...] is the determination of Being as presence in all senses of this word. It could be shown that all the names related to fundamentals, to principles, or to the centre have always designated an invariable presence – eidos, archē, telos, energeia, ousia (essence, existence, substance, subject), alētheia, transcendentality, consciousness, God, man, and so forth.

    — 'Structure, Sign and Play' in Writing and Difference, p. 353.

69. ^Jacques Derrida, 'Genesis' and 'Structure' and Phenomenology,' in Writing and Difference (London: Routledge, 1978), paper originally delivered in 1959 at Cerisy-la-Salle, and originally published in Gandillac, Goldmann & Piaget (eds.), Genèse et structure (The Hague: Morton, 1964), p. 167:

    All these formulations have been possible thanks to the initial distinction between different irreducible types of genesis and structure: worldly genesis and transcendental genesis, empirical structure, eidetic structure, and transcendental structure. To ask oneself the following historico-semantic question: 'What does the notion of genesis in general, on whose basis the Husserlian diffraction could come forth and be understood, mean, and what has it always meant? What does the notion of structure in general, on whose basis Husserl operates and operates distinctions between empirical, eidetic, and transcendental dimensions mean, and what has it always meant throughout its displacements? And what is the historico-semantic relationship between Genesis and structure in general?' is not only simply to ask a prior linguistic question. It is to ask the question about the unity of the historical ground on whose basis a transcendental reduction is possible and is motivated by itself. It is to ask the question about the unity of the world from which transcendental freedom releases itself, in order to make the origin of this unity appear.

70. ^If in 1959 Derrida was addressing this question of genesis and structure to Husserl, that is, to phenomenology, then in 'Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences' (also in Writing and Difference; see below), he addresses these same questions to Lévi-Strauss and the structuralists. This is clear from the very first line of the paper (p. 278):

    Perhaps something has occurred in the history of the concept of structure that could be called an 'event,' if this loaded word did not entail a meaning which it is precisely the function of structural—or structuralist—thought to reduce or to suspect.

    Between these two papers is staked Derrida's philosophical ground, if not indeed his step beyond or outside philosophy.

71. ^Derrida (1971), Scarpetta interview, quote from pp. 77–8:

    If the alterity of the other is posed, that is, only posed, does it not amount to the same, for example in the form of the 'constituted object' or of the 'informed product' invested with meaning, etc.? From this point of view, I would even say that the alterity of the other inscribes in this relationship that which in no case can be 'posed.' Inscription, as I would define it in this respect, is not a simple position: it is rather that by means of which every position is of itself confounded (différance): inscription, mark, text and not only thesis or theme-inscription of the thesis.

    On the phrase 'default of origin' as applied to Derrida's work, cf. Bernard Stiegler, 'Derrida and Technology: Fidelity at the Limits of Deconstruction and the Prosthesis of Faith,' in Tom Cohen (ed.) Jacques Derrida and the Humanities (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001). Stiegler understands Derrida's thinking of textuality and inscription in terms of a thinking of originary technicity, and in this context speaks of 'the originary default of origin that arche-writing constitutes' (p. 239). See also Stiegler, Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998).

72. ^It is opposed to the concept of original purity, which destabilises the thought of both 'genesis' and 'structure', cf. Rodolphe Gasché, The Tain of the Mirror (Cambridge, Massachusetts, & London: Harvard University Press, 1986), p. 146:

    It is an opening that is structural or the structurality of an opening. Yet each of these concepts excludes the other. It is thus as little a structure as it is an opening; it is as little static as it is genetic, as little structural as it is historical. It can be understood neither from a genetic nor from a structuralist and taxonomic point of view, nor from a combination of both points of view.

    And note that this complexity of the origin is thus not only spatial but temporal, which is why différance is a matter not only of difference but of delay or deferral. One way in which this question is raised in relation to Husserl is thus the question of the possibility of a phenomenology of history, which Derrida raises in Edmund Husserl's Origin of Geometry: An Introduction (1962).

73. ^Cf. Rodolphe Gasché, 'Infrastructures and Systematicity,' in John Sallis (ed.), Deconstruction and Philosophy (Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 1987), pp. 3–4:

    One of the more persistent misunderstandings that have thus far forestalled a productive debate with Derrida's philosophical thought is the assumption, shared by many philosophers as well as literary critics, that within that thought just anything is possible. Derrida's philosophy is more often than not construed as a license for arbitrary free play in flagrant disregard of all established rules of argumentation, traditional requirements of thought, and ethical standards binding upon the interpretative community. Undoubtedly, some of the works of Derrida may not have been entirely innocent in this respect and may have contributed, however obliquely, to fostering to some extent that very misconception. But deconstruction which for many has come to designate the content and style of Derrida's thinking, reveals to even a superficial examination, a well-ordered procedure, a step-by-step type of argumentation based on an acute awareness of level-distinctions, a marked thoroughness and regularity. [...] Deconstruction must be understood, we contend, as the attempt to 'account,' in a certain manner, for a heterogeneous variety or manifold of nonlogical contradictions and discursive equalities of all sorts that continues to haunt and fissure even the successful development of philosophical arguments and their systematic exposition.

74. ^ ^abDerrida (1967) interview with Henri Ronse, pp. 4–5: '[Speech and Phenomena] is perhaps the essay which I like most. Doubtless, I could have bound it as a long note to one or the other of the other two works. Of Grammatology refers to it and economizes its development. But in a classical philosophical architecture, Speech... would come first: in it is posed, at a point which appears juridically decisive for reasons that I cannot explain here, the question of the privilege of the voice and of phonetic writing in their relationship to the entire history of the West, such as this history can be represented by the history of metaphysics and metaphysics in its most modern, critical and vigilant form: Husserl's transcendental phenomenology.'
75. ^ ^abDerrida (1967) interview with Henri Ronse, p. 8
76. ^ ^abOn the influence of Heidegger, Derrida claims in his 'Letter to a Japanese Friend' (Derrida and différance, eds. Robert Bernasconi and David Wood) that the word 'déconstruction' was his attempt both to translate and re-appropriate for his own ends the Heideggerian terms Destruktion and Abbau, via a word from the French language, the varied senses of which seemed consistent with his requirements. This relationship with the Heideggerian term was chosen over the Nietzschean term 'demolition,' as Derrida shared Heidegger's interest in renovating philosophy.
77. ^Derrida, J. Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas, Writing and Difference. Chicago: University of Chicago. 97–192.
78. ^Caputo (1997), p. 42
79. ^Linguistics and Grammatology in Of Grammatology, pp. 27–73
80. ^ ^ab'From Restricted to General Economy: A Hegelianism without Reserve' in Writing and Difference
81. ^ ^ab'Cogito and the History of Madness' in Writing and Difference
82. ^The Violence of the Letter: From Lévi-Strauss to Rousseau in Of Grammatology, pp. 101–140
83. ^'Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences' in Writing and Difference
84. ^Of Grammatology, pp. 83–86.
85. ^'Freud and the Scene of Writing' in Writing and Difference
86. ^'Edmond Jabès and the Question of the Book' and 'Ellipsis' in Writing and Difference, pp. 64-78 and 295-300.
87. ^'La Parole soufflée' and 'The Theater of Cruelty and the Closure of Representation' in Writing and Difference
88. ^ ^abcdLamont, Michele (November 1987). 'How to Become a Dominant French Philosopher: The Case of Jacques Derrida'(PDF). American Journal of Sociology. 93 (3): 584–622. doi:10.1086/228790. JSTOR2780292.
89. ^ ^abcWayne A. Borody (1998) pp. 3, 5 Figuring the Phallogocentric Argument with Respect to the Classical Greek Philosophical TraditionNebula: A Netzine of the Arts and Science, Vol. 13 (pp. 1–27).
90. ^Hélène Cixous, Catherine Clément [1975] La jeune née
91. ^Spurgin, Tim (1997) Reader's Guide to Derrida's 'Plato's Pharmacy'Archived February 24, 2011, at the Wayback Machine
92. ^Graff (1993)
93. ^ ^abSven Ove Hansson 'Philosophical Schools'. Archived from the original on July 18, 2006. Retrieved February 24, 2008.CS1 maint: BOT: original-url status unknown (link) – Editorial From Theoria vol. 72, Part 1 (2006).
94. ^Derrida (1989) Of Spirit, pp.vii-1
95. ^Derrida (1989) Of Spirit, p. 1
96. ^Derrida (1989) Of Spirit, p. 7, 11, 117–118
97. ^Derrida (1989) Of Spirit, pp. 8–12
98. ^Powell (2006), p. 167.
99. ^Nussbaum, Martha C. (1990). 'Form and Content, Philosophy and Literature'. Love's Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature (1st ed.). New York: Oxford University Press. p. 29. ISBN978-0195074857. '[He] chose to address the American Philosophical Association on the topic of Aristotle's theory of friendship ('Journal of Philosophy' 85 (1988), 632-44); Barbara Johnson's 'A World of Difference' (Baltimore, 1987) argues that Deconstruction can make valuable ethical and social contributions; and in general there seems to be a return to the ethical and practical...
100. ^Rorty, R. (1995). Habermas, Derrida, and the functions of philosophy. Revue internationale de philosophie, 49(194 (4), 437-459.
101. ^Rorty, R. (1989). Is Derrida a transcendental philosopher?. The Yale Journal of Criticism, 2(2), 207.
102. ^McCumber, J. (2000). Philosophy and Freedom: Derrida, Rorty, Habermas, Foucault. Indiana University Press.
103. ^Jack Reynolds, Jonathan Roffe (2004) Understanding Derrida p. 49
104. ^Gift of Death, pp. 57–72
105. ^B. L. Ettinger in conversation with Emmanuel Lévinas, 'Que dirait Eurydice?' / 'What would Eurydice Say?' (1991-93). Reprinted to coincide with Kabinet exhibition at Stedelijk Museum, Amsterdam. Paris: BLE Atelier, 1997. This is a reprint of Le féminin est cette différence inouïe (Livre d'artiste, 1994, and it includes the text of Time is the Breath of the Spirit, MOMA, Oxford, 1993.) Reprinted in Athena: Philosophical Studies. Vol. 2, 2006.
106. ^The Other Heading, pp. 5–6
107. ^Derrida (2008), 15
108. ^Derrida (2002) Q&A session at Film Forum
109. ^Derrida (2005) [1997]. 'Les Intellectuels' (in French): 39–40Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
110. ^Derrida (1991) 'A 'Madness' Must Watch Over Thinking', pp. 347–9.
111. ^Bennington (1991), p. 332
112. ^Powell (2006), p. 151
113. ^Jacques Derrida, 'To Do Justice to Freud': The History of Madness in the Age of Psychoanalysis,' Resistances of Psychoanalysis (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998) pp. 70–1.
114. ^Derrida, Jacques. 'No Apocalypse, Not Now (full speed ahead, seven missiles, seven missives)'. Diacritics, 1984
115. ^Peeters, Benoit (August 27, 2013). Derrida: A Biography. John Wiley & Sons. ISBN9780745663029.
116. ^Gide's Les nourritures terrestres, book IV: «Familles, je vous hais! Foyers clos; portes refermées; possessions jalouses du bonheur.»
117. ^1991 Interview with Francois EwaldWahn muß übers Denken wachen published in: Werner Kolk (Translator). Literataz. 1992, p. 1-2. (German), as quoted in http://escholarship.org/uc/item/3891m6db#page-1
118. ^Pearson, Roger (May 15, 2010). Stéphane Mallarmé. Reaktion Books. p. 217. ISBN9781861897275.
119. ^Silverman, Hugh (Spring 2007). 'Tracing Responsibility: Levinas between Merleau-Ponty and Derrida'. Journal of French Philosophy. 17: 88–89 – via ResearchGate.
120. ^Foucault, Michel, History of Madness, ed. Jean Khalfa, trans. Jonathan Murphy and Jean Khalfa (London: Routledge, 2006), p. xxiv,573.
121. ^ ^abCarlo Ginzburg [1976], Il formaggio e i vermi, translated in 1980 as The Cheese and the Worms: The Cosmos of a Sixteenth-Century Miller, trans. Anne Tedeschi (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press), xviii. ISBN978-0-8018-4387-7
122. ^'Derrida Seminar Translation Project'. Derridaseminars.org. Retrieved October 21, 2012.
123. ^'Derrida Seminar Translation Project'. Derridaseminars.org. Retrieved January 1, 2014.
124. ^'Lovely Luton'. Hydra.humanities.uci.edu. Retrieved October 21, 2012.
125. ^Speech and Phenomena, Introduction
126. ^Of Grammatology, Part I.1
127. ^Poster (2010), pp. 3–4, 12–13
128. ^Derrida [1982] Excuse me, but I never said exactly so: Yet Another Derridean InterviewArchived April 13, 2016, at the Wayback Machine, with Paul Brennan, On the Beach (Glebe NSW, Australia). No.1/1983: p. 42
129. ^Derrida 1972 Signature Event Context
130. ^Chora L Works: Jacques Derrida and Peter Eisenman
131. ^(Nader El-Bizri, 2004, 2011)
132. ^(Nader El-Bizri, 2018)
133. ^(Nader El-Bizri, 2001, 2004, 2011, 2015)
134. ^Nader El-Bizri, 'Being at Home Among Things: Heidegger's Reflections on Dwelling', Environment, Space, Place Vol. 3 (2011), pp. 47–71; Nader El-Bizri, 'On Dwelling: Heideggerian Allusions to Architectural Phenomenology', Studia UBB. Philosophia, Vol. 60, No. 1 (2015): 5–30; Nader El-Bizri, 'Phenomenology of Place and Space in our Epoch: Thinking along Heideggerian Pathways', in The Phenomenology of Real and Virtual Places, ed. E. Champion (London : Routledge, 2018), pp. 123–143.
135. ^Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty (1995). 'Ghostwriting'. Diacritics. 25 (2): 64–84. doi:10.2307/465145. JSTOR465145.
136. ^|Jacques Derrida|Marx & Sons|Sprinker, Michael, ed. (2008). 'Chapter 10: Marx & Sons'. Ghostly Deamarctations: A Symposium On Jacques Derrida's 'Specters of Marx'. chapter by Jacques Derrida. London: Verso. p. 223. ISBN9781844672110.
137. ^Sprinker, Michael, ed. (2008). 'Chapter 5: Marxism without Marx'. Ghostly Deamarctations: A Symposium On Jacques Derrida's 'Specters of Marx'. chapter by Terry Eagleton. London: Verso. pp. 83–7. ISBN9781844672110.
138. ^Garver, Newton (1991). 'Derrida's language-games'. Topoi. 10 (2): 187–98. doi:10.1007/BF00141339
139. ^'Truth and Consequences: How to Understand Jacques Derrida,' The New Republic 197:14 (October 5, 1987).
140. ^J.E. D'Ulisse, Derrida (1930–2004), New Partisan, December 24, 2004. Archived March 10, 2016, at the Wayback Machine
141. ^Rorty, Richard. Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. ISBN0-521-36781-6. Ch. 6: 'From ironist theory to private allusions: Derrida'
142. ^'Deconstructing Jacques'. The Guardian. October 12, 2004.
143. ^Chomsky, Noam (August 2012). 'Postmodernism?'. ZCommunications. Retrieved September 27, 2014.
144. ^Paul R. Gross and Norman Levitt, Higher Superstition: The Academic Left and Its Quarrels With Science (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994).
145. ^Derrida, Jacques. Limited, Inc. Northwestern University Press, 1988. p. 29: '...I have read some of his [Searle's] work (more, in any case, than he seems to have read of mine)'
146. ^Maclean, Ian. 2004. 'un dialogue de sourds? Some implications of the Austin–Searle–Derrida debate', in Jacques Derrida: critical thought. Ian Maclachlan (ed.) Ashgate Publishing, 2004
147. ^ ^abcAlfino, Mark (1991). 'Another Look at the Derrida-Searle Debate'. Philosophy & Rhetoric. 24 (2): 143–152. JSTOR40237667.
148. ^Simon Glendinning. 2001. Arguing with Derrida. Wiley-Blackwell. p. 18
149. ^Gregor Campbell. 1993. 'John R. Searle' in Irene Rima Makaryk (ed). Encyclopedia of contemporary literary theory: approaches, scholars, terms. University of Toronto Press, 1993
150. ^John Searle, 'Reiterating the Différences: A Reply to Derrida', Glyph 2 (Baltimore MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977).
151. ^ ^abMarian Hobson. 1998. Jacques Derrida: opening lines. Psychology Press. pp. 95-97
152. ^ ^abcSearle, John R. (1994). 'Literary Theory and Its Discontents'. Journal of Humanistic Psychology. 25 (3): 637–67. doi:10.2307/469470. JSTOR469470.
153. ^Searle, John R. (October 27, 1983). 'The Word Turned Upside Down'. The New York Review of Books. Archived from the original on October 13, 2012. Retrieved August 21, 2013.
154. ^ ^abcJacques Derrida, 'Afterwords' in Limited, Inc. (Northwestern University Press, 1988), p. 133
155. ^Farrell, Frank B. (1988). 'Iterability and Meaning: The Searle-Derrida Debate'. Metaphilosophy. 19: 53–64. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9973.1988.tb00701.x.
156. ^Fish, Stanley E. (1982). 'With the Compliments of the Author: Reflections on Austin and Derrida'. Critical Inquiry. 8 (4): 693–721. JSTOR1343193.
157. ^Wright, Edmond (1982). 'Derrida, Searle, Contexts, Games, Riddles'. New Literary History. 13 (3): 463–477. doi:10.2307/468793. JSTOR468793.
158. ^Culler, Jonathan (1981). 'Convention and Meaning: Derrida and Austin'. New Literary History. 13 (1): 15–30. doi:10.2307/468640. JSTOR468640.
159. ^Kenaan, Hagi (2002). Continental Philosophy Review. 35 (2): 117–133. doi:10.1023/A:1016583115826.Missing or empty |title= (help)
160. ^Raffel, Stanley (2011). 'Understanding Each Other: The Case of the Derrida-Searle Debate'. Human Studies. 34 (3): 277–292. doi:10.1007/s10746-011-9189-6.
161. ^Searle The Construction of Social Reality (1995) pp. 157–160.
162. ^Tr. by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. Johns Hopkins University Press. Baltimore, 1976, 158–59
163. ^Derrida, Jacques (1988). 'Afterword: Toward An Ethic of Discussion'. Limited Inc (1st ed.). Illinois: Northwestern University Press. p. 136. ISBN978-0810107885. The phrase which for some has become a sort of slogan, in general so badly understood, of deconstruction ('there is no outside-text' [il n'y a pas de hors-texte]), means nothing else: there is nothing outside context. In this form, which says exactly the same thing, the formula would doubtless have been less shocking. I am not certain that it would have provided more to think about.
164. ^Barry Smith et al., 'Open letter against Derrida receiving an honorary doctorate from Cambridge University,' The Times [London], 9 May 1992 [1].
165. ^John Rawlings (1999) Presidential Lectures: Jacques Derrida: Introduction at Stanford University
166. ^Richmond, Sarah (April 1996). 'Derrida and Analytical Philosophy: Speech Acts and their Force'. European Journal of Philosophy. 4 (1): 38–62. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0378.1996.tb00064.x.
167. ^Derrida, Jacques (1995). ''Honoris Causa: 'This is also very funny''. Points . .: Interviews, 1974-1994 (1st ed.). New York: Stanford University Press. pp. 409–413. ISBN978-0810103979. If it were only a question of 'my' work, of the particular or isolated research of one individual, this wouldn't happen. Indeed, the violence of these denunciations derives from the fact that the work accused is part of a whole ongoing process. What is unfolding here, like the resistance it necessarily arouses, can't be limited to a personal 'oeuvre,' nor to a discipline, nor even to the academic institution. Nor in particular to a generation: it's often the active involvement of students and younger teachers which makes certain of our colleagues nervous to the point that they lose their sense of moderation and of the academic rules they invoke when they attack me and my work.
     If this work seems so threatening to them, this is because it isn't simply eccentric or strange, incomprehensible or exotic (which would allow them to dispose of it easily), but as I myself hope, and as they believe more than they admit, competent, rigorously argued, and carrying conviction in its re-examination of the fundamental norms and premises of a number of dominant discourses, the principles underlying many of their evaluations, the structures of academic institutions, and the research that goes on within them. What this kind of questioning does is modify the rules of the dominant discourse, it tries to politicize and democratize the university scene. ...
     In short, to answer your question about the 'exceptional violence,' the compulsive 'ferocity,' and the 'exaggeration' of the 'attacks,' I would say that these critics organize and practice in my case a sort of obsessive personality cult which philosophers should know how to question and above all to moderate.
168. ^Richard Wolin, Preface to the MIT press edition: Note on a missing text. In R. Wolin (ed.) The Heidegger Controversy: A Critical Reader. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 1993, p. xiii. ISBN0-262-73101-0
169. ^NYBooks.com: 2658 and NYBooks.com: 2591
170. ^Derrida, 'The Work of Intellectuals and the Press (The Bad Example: How the New York Review of Books and Company do Business)', published in the book Points... (1995; see the footnote about ISBN0-226-14314-7, here) (see also the [1992] French version Points de suspension: entretiens (ISBN0-8047-2488-1) there).
171. ^Points, p. 434
172. ^The Economist. Obituary: Jacques Derrida, French intellectual, October 21, 2004
173. ^The Independent
174. ^Jonathan Culler (2008) Why deconstruction still matters: A conversation with Jonathan Culler, interviewed by Paul Sawyer for The Cornell Chronicle, January 24, 2008

Works cited[edit]

Jacques Derrida Differance Pdf In Word

• Geoffrey Bennington (1991). Jacques Derrida, University of Chicago Press. Section Curriculum vitae, pp. 325–36. Excerpts. ISBN9780226042626
• Caputo, John D. (ed.) (1997). Deconstruction in a Nutshell: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida. New York: Fordham University Press. Transcript (which is also available here at the Wayback Machine (archived September 1, 2006)) of the Roundtable Discussion with Jacques Derrida at Villanova University, October 3, 1994. With commentary by Caputo.
• Cixous, Hélène (2001). Portrait of Jacques Derrida as a Young Jewish Saint (English edition, New York: Columbia University Press, 2004). OCLC1025139739, 265430083, 448343513, 1036830179
• Derrida (1967): interview with Henri Ronse, republished in Positions (English edition, Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 1981).
• Derrida (1971): interview with Guy Scarpetta, republished in Positions (English edition, Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 1981).
• Derrida (1976). Where a Teaching Body Begins and How It Ends, republished in Who's Afraid of Philosophy?.
• Derrida (1988). Afterword: Toward An Ethic of Discussion, published in the English translation of Limited Inc.
• Derrida (1989). This Strange Institution Called Literature, interview published in Acts of Literature (1991), pp. 33–75
• Derrida (1990). Once Again from the Top: Of the Right to Philosophy, interview with Robert Maggiori for Libération, November 15, 1990, republished in Points...: Interviews, 1974-1994 (1995).
• Derrida (1991). 'A 'Madness' Must Watch Over Thinking', interview with Francois Ewald for Le Magazine Litteraire, March 1991, republished in Points...: Interviews, 1974-1994 (1995).
• Derrida (1992). Derrida's interview in The Cambridge Review 113, October 1992. Reprinted in Points...: Interviews, 1974–1994 Stanford University Press (1995) and retitled as Honoris Causa: 'This is also extremely funny,' pp. 399–421. Excerpt.
• Derrida (1993). Specters of Marx.
• Derrida et al. (1994): roundtable discussion: Of the Humanities and Philosophical Disciplines Surfaces Vol. VI.108 (v.1.0A – August 16, 1996) – ISSN1188-2492 Later republished in Ethics, Institutions, and the Right to Philosophy (2002).
• Derrida and Ferraris (1997). I Have a Taste for Secret, 1993–5 conversations with Maurizio Ferraris and Giorgio Vattimo, in Derrida and Ferraris [1997] A Taste for the Secret, translated by Giacomo Donis.
• Derrida (1997): interview Les Intellectuels: tentative de définition par eux-mêmes. Enquête, published in a special number of journal Lignes, 32 (1997): 57–68, republished in Papier Machine (2001), and translated into English as Intellectuals. Attempt at Definition by Themselves. Survey, in Derrida (2005) Paper machine.
• Derrida (2002): Q&A session at Film Forum, New York City, October 23, 2002, transcript by Gil Kofman. Published in Kirby Dick, Amy Ziering Kofman, Jacques Derrida (2005). Derrida: screenplay and essays on the film.
• Graff, Gerald (1993). Is Reason in Trouble? in Proc. Am. Philos. Soc., 137, no. 4, 1993, pp. 680–88.
• Kritzman, Lawrence (ed., 2005). The Columbia History of Twentieth-Century French Thought, Columbia University Press.
• Mackey, Louis (1984) with a reply by Searle. An Exchange on Deconstruction, in New York Review of Books, February 2, 1984
• Peeters, Benoît (2012). Derrida: A Biography. Polity.
• Powell, Jason (2006). Jacques Derrida: A Biography. London and New York: Continuum.
• Poster, Mark (1988). Critical theory and poststructuralism: in search of a context, section Introduction: Theory and the problem of Context.
• Poster, Mark (2010). McLuhan and the Cultural Theory of Media, MediaTropes eJournal, Vol. II, No. 2 (2010): 1–18.
• Searle (1983). The Word Turned Upside Down, in The New York Review of Books, October 1983.
• Searle (2000). Reality Principles: An Interview with John R. Searle. Reason.com. February 2000 issue, accessed online on 30-08-2010.

Further reading[edit]

Introductory works[edit]

• Adleman, Dan (2010) 'Deconstricting Derridean Genre Theory' (PDF)
• Culler, Jonathan (1975) Structuralist Poetics.
• Culler, Jonathan (1983) On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism after Structuralism.
• Descombes, Vincent (1980) Modern French Philosophy.
• Deutscher, Penelope (2006) How to Read Derrida (ISBN978-0-393-32879-0).
• Mark Dooley and Liam Kavanagh (2007) The Philosophy of Derrida, London: Acumen Press, 2006; Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press.
• Goldschmit, Marc (2003) Jacques Derrida, une introduction' Paris, Agora Pocket, ISBN2-266-11574-X.
• Hill, Leslie (2007) The Cambridge introduction to Jacques Derrida
• Jameson, Fredric (1972) The Prison-House of Language.
• Leitch, Vincent B. (1983) Deconstructive Criticism: An Advanced Introduction.
• Lentricchia, Frank (1980) After the New Criticism.
• Moati Raoul (2009), Derrida/Searle, déconstruction et langage ordinaire
• Norris, Christopher (1982) Deconstruction: Theory and Practice.
• Thomas, Michael (2006) The Reception of Derrida: Translation and Transformation.
• Wise, Christopher (2009) Derrida, Africa, and the Middle East.

Other works[edit]

• Agamben, Giorgio. 'Pardes: The Writing of Potentiality,' in Giorgio Agamben, Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy, ed. and trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005. 205-19.
• Beardsworth, Richard, Derrida and the Political (ISBN0-415-10967-1).
• Bennington, Geoffrey, Legislations (ISBN0-86091-668-5).
• Bennington, Geoffrey, Interrupting Derrida (ISBN0-415-22427-6).
• Critchley, Simon, The Ethics of Deconstruction: Derrida and Levinas, 3rd Edition. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. March 18, 2014. p. 352. ISBN9780748689323.
• Caputo, John D., The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida.
• Coward, Harold G. (ed) Derrida and Negative theology, SUNY 1992. ISBN0-7914-0964-3
• de Man, Paul, 'The Rhetoric of Blindness: Jacques Derrida's Reading of Rousseau,' in Paul de Man, Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism, second edition, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983. 102-41.
• El-Bizri, Nader, 'Qui-êtes vous Khôra?: Receiving Plato's Timaeus', Existentia Meletai-Sophias 11 (2001), pp. 473–490.
• El-Bizri, Nader, 'ON KAI KHORA: Situating Heidegger between the Sophist and the Timaeus,' Studia Phaenomenologica 4 (2004), pp. 73–98.
• Fabbri, Lorenzo. 'Chronotopologies of the Exception. Agamben and Derrida before the Camps', 'Diacritics,' Volume 39, Number 3 (2009): 77-95.
• Foucault, Michel, 'My Body, This Paper, This Fire,' in Michel Foucault, History of Madness, ed. Jean Khalfa, trans. Jonathan Murphy and Jean Khalfa, London: Routledge, 2006. 550-74.
• Fradet, Pierre-Alexandre, Derrida-Bergson. Sur l'immédiateté, Hermann, Paris, coll. 'Hermann Philosophie', 2014. ISBN9782705688318
• Gasché, Rodolphe, Inventions of Difference: On Jacques Derrida.
• Gasché, Rodolphe, The Tain of the Mirror.
• Goldschmit, Marc, Une langue à venir. Derrida, l'écriture hyperbolique Paris, Lignes et Manifeste, 2006. ISBN2-84938-058-X
• Habermas, Jürgen, 'Beyond a Temporalized Philosophy of Origins: Jacques Derrida's Critique of Phonocentrism,' in Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures, trans. Frederick G. Lawrence, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990. 161-84.
• Hägglund, Martin, Radical Atheism: Derrida and the Time of Life, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008.
• Hamacher, Werner, Lingua amissa, Buenos Aires: Miño y Dávila editores, 2012.
• Kierans, Kenneth (1997). 'Beyond Deconstruction'(PDF). Animus. 2. ISSN1209-0689. Retrieved August 17, 2011.
• Kopić, Mario, Izazovi post-metafizike, Sremski Karlovci - Novi Sad: Izdavačka knjižarnica, 2007. (ISBN978-86-7543-120-6)
• Kopić, Mario, Nezacjeljiva rana svijeta, Zagreb: Antibarbarus, 2007. (ISBN978-953-249-035-0)
• Mackey, Louis, 'Slouching Toward Bethlehem: Deconstructive Strategies in Theology,' in Anglican Theological Review, Volume LXV, Number 3, July, 1983. 255–272.
• Mackey, Louis, 'A Nicer Knowledge of Belief' in Loius Mackey, An Ancient Quarrel Continued: The Troubled Marriage of Philosophy and Literature, Lanham, University Press of America, 2002. 219–240 (ISBN978-0761822677)
• Magliola, Robert, Derrida on the Mend, Lafayette: Purdue UP, 1984; 1986; rpt. 2000 (ISBN0-911198-69-5). (Initiated what has become a very active area of study in Buddhology and comparative philosophy, the comparison of Derridean deconstruction and Buddhist philosophy, especially Madhyamikan and Zen Buddhist philosophy.)
• Magliola, Robert, On Deconstructing Life-Worlds: Buddhism, Christianity, Culture, Atlanta: Scholars P, American Academy of Religion, 1997; Oxford: Oxford UP, 2000 (ISBN0-7885-0296-4). (Further develops comparison of Derridean thought and Buddhism.)
• Marder, Michael, The Event of the Thing: Derrida's Post-Deconstructive Realism, Toronto: Toronto UP, 2009. (ISBN0-8020-9892-4)
• Miller, J. Hillis, For Derrida, New York: Fordham University Press, 2009.
• Mouffe, Chantal (ed.), Deconstruction and Pragmatism, with essays by Simon Critchley, Ernesto Laclau, Richard Rorty, and Derrida.
• Norris, Christopher, Derrida (ISBN0-674-19823-9).
• Park, Jin Y., ed., Buddhisms and Deconstructions, Lanham: Rowland and Littlefield, 2006 (ISBN978-0-7425-3418-6; ISBN0-7425-3418-9). (Several of the collected papers specifically treat Derrida and Buddhist thought.)
• Rapaport, Herman, Later Derrida (ISBN0-415-94269-1).
• Rorty, Richard, 'From Ironist Theory to Private Allusions: Derrida,' in Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. 121-37.
• Ross, Stephen David, Betraying Derrida, for Life, Atropos Press, 2013.
• Roudinesco, Elisabeth, Philosophy in Turbulent Times: Canguilhem, Sartre, Foucault, Althusser, Deleuze, Derrida, Columbia University Press, New York, 2008.
• Sallis, John (ed.), Deconstruction and Philosophy, with essays by Rodolphe Gasché, John D. Caputo, Robert Bernasconi, David Wood, and Derrida.
• Sallis, John (2009). The Verge of Philosophy. University of Chicago Press. ISBN978-0-226-73431-6
• Salvioli, Marco, Il Tempo e le Parole. Ricoeur e Derrida a 'margine' della fenomenologia, ESD, Bologna 2006.
• Smith, James K. A., Jacques Derrida: Live Theory.
• Sprinker, Michael, ed. Ghostly Demarcations: A Symposium on Jacques Derrida's Specters of Marx, London and New York: Verso, 1999; rpt. 2008. (Includes Derrida's reply, 'Marx & Sons.')
• Stiegler, Bernard, 'Derrida and Technology: Fidelity at the Limits of Deconstruction and the Prosthesis of Faith,' in Tom Cohen (ed.), Jacques Derrida and the Humanities (ISBN0-521-62565-3).
• Wood, David (ed.), Derrida: A Critical Reader, Wiley-Blackwell, 1992.
• Zlomislic, Marko, Jacques Derrida's Aporetic Ethics, Lexington Books, 2004.

External links[edit]

• Leonard Lawlor. Entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
• Gerry Coulter. Passings: Taking Derrida Seriously. Volume 2, Number 1, January 2005
• John Rawlings. Jacques Derrida Stanford Presidential Lectures in the Humanities and Arts
• Jean-Michel Rabaté. Jacques Derrida at the Wayback Machine (archived May 3, 2003) Johns Hopkins Guide to Literary Theory.
• Eddie Yeghiayan. Books and contributions to books at the Library of Congress Web Archives (archived November 15, 2001) (up to 2001), Bibliography and translations list
• Guide to the Jacques Derrida Papers. Special Collections and Archives, The UC Irvine Libraries, Irvine, California.
• Guide to the Saffa Fathy Video Recordings of Jacques Derrida Lectures. Special Collections and Archives, The UC Irvine Libraries, Irvine, California.
• Guide to the Jacques Derrida Listserv Collection. Special Collections and Archives, The UC Irvine Libraries, Irvine, California.
• Mario Perniola, Remembering Derrida, in 'SubStance' (University of California), 2005, n.1, issue 106.
• Rick Roderick, Derrida and the Ends of Man, in 'The Self Under Siege: Philosophy in the 20th Century (1993)' (University of Texas, Austin).

Différance is a French term coined by Jacques Derrida. It is a central concept in Derrida's deconstruction, a critical outlook concerned with the relationship between text and meaning. The term différance means 'difference and deferral of meaning.'

• 2Between structure and genesis
• 3The web of language
• 4Deconstruction and the history of philosophy

Overview[edit]

Derrida first uses the term différance in his 1963 paper 'Cogito et histoire de la folie'.^[1] The term différance then played a key role in Derrida's engagement with the philosophy of Edmund Husserl in Speech and Phenomena. The term was then elaborated in various other works, notably in his essay 'Différance' and in various interviews collected in Positions.^[2]

The ⟨a⟩ of différance is a deliberate misspelling of différence, though the two are pronounced identically, IPA: [difeʁɑ̃s] (différance plays on the fact that the French word différer means both 'to defer' and 'to differ'). This misspelling highlights the fact that its written form is not heard, and serves to further subvert the traditional privileging of speech over writing (see archi-writing and logocentrism), as well as the distinction between the sensible and the intelligible. The difference articulated by the ⟨a⟩ in différance is not apparent to the senses via sound, 'but neither cannot it belong to intelligibility, to the ideality which is not fortuitously associated with the objectivity of theorein or understanding.'^[3] This is because the language of understanding is already caught up in sensible metaphors—for example, θεωρεῖν (theōrein) means 'to see' in Ancient Greek.

In the essay 'Différance' Derrida indicates that différance gestures at a number of heterogeneous features that govern the production of textual meaning. The first (relating to deferral) is the notion that words and signs can never fully summon forth what they mean, but can only be defined through appeal to additional words, from which they differ. Thus, meaning is forever 'deferred' or postponed through an endless chain of signifiers. The second (relating to difference, sometimes referred to as espacement or 'spacing') concerns the force that differentiates elements from one another, and in so doing engenders binary oppositions and hierarchies that underpin meaning itself.

Derrida developed the concept of différance deeper in the course of an argument against the phenomenology of Husserl, who sought a rigorous analysis of the role of memory and perception in our understanding of sequential items such as music or language. Derrida's approach argues that because the perceiver's mental state is constantly in flux and differs from one re-reading to the next, a general theory describing this phenomenon is unachievable.

A term related to the idea of différance in Derrida's thought is the supplement, 'itself bound up in a supplementary play of meaning which defies semantic reduction.'^[4]

Between structure and genesis[edit]

Derrida approaches texts as constructed around elemental oppositions which all speech has to articulate if it intends to make any sense whatsoever. This is so because identity is viewed in non-essentialist terms as a construct, and because constructs only produce meaning through the interplay of differences inside a 'system of distinct signs'. This approach to text, in a broad sense,^[5][6] emerges from semiology advanced by Ferdinand de Saussure.

Saussure is considered one of the fathers of structuralism when he explained that terms get their meaning in reciprocal determination with other terms inside language:

In language there are only differences. Even more important: a difference generally implies positive terms between which the difference is set up; but in language there are only differences without positive terms. Whether we take the signified or the signifier, language has neither ideas nor sounds that existed before the linguistic system, but only conceptual and phonic differences that have issued from the system. The idea or phonic substance that a sign contains is of less importance than the other signs that surround it. ... A linguistic system is a series of differences of sound combined with a series of differences of ideas; but the pairing of a certain number of acoustical signs with as many cuts made from the mass thought engenders a system of values.^[7]

Saussure explicitly suggested linguistics was only a branch of a more general semiology, of a science of signs in general, being human codes only one among others. Nevertheless, in the end, as Derrida pointed out, he made of linguistics 'the regulatory model', and 'for essential, and essentially metaphysical, reasons had to privilege speech, and everything that links the sign to phone':^[8] Derrida will prefer to follow the more 'fruitful paths (formalization)' of a general semiotics without falling in what he considered 'a hierarchizing teleology' privileging linguistics, and speak of 'mark' rather than of language, not as something restricted to mankind, but as prelinguistic, as the pure possibility of language, working every where there is a relation to something else.

Derrida sees these differences as elemental oppositions working in all languages, systems of distinct signs, and codes, where terms don't have absolute meanings but instead draw meaning from reciprocal determination with other terms. This structural difference is the first component that Derrida will take into account when articulating the meaning of différance, a mark he felt the need to create and will become a fundamental tool in his lifelong work: deconstruction:^[9]

Différance is the systematic play of differences, of the traces of differences, of the spacing by means of which elements are related to each other. This spacing is the simultaneously active and passive (the a of différance indicates this indecision as concerns activity and passivity, that which cannot be governed by or distributed between the terms of this opposition) production of the intervals without which the 'full' terms would not signify, would not function.

But structural difference will not be considered without him already destabilizing from the start its static, synchronic, taxonomic, ahistoric motifs, remembering that all structure already refers to the generative movement in the play of differences:^[10]

The other main component of différance is deferring, which takes into account the fact that meaning is not only synchrony with all the other terms inside a structure, but also diachrony, with everything that was and will be said, in History, difference as structure and deferring as genesis:^[11][12]

'the a of différance also recalls that spacing is temporization, the detour and postponement by means of which intuition, perception, consummation—in a word, the relationship to the present, the reference to a present reality, to a being—are always deferred. Deferred by virtue of the very principle of difference which holds that an element functions and signifies, takes on or conveys meaning, only by referring to another past or future element in an economy of traces. This economic aspect of différance, which brings into play a certain not conscious calculation in a field of forces, is inseparable from the more narrowly semiotic aspect of différance.

This confirms the subject as not present to itself and constituted on becoming space, in temporizing and also, as Saussure said, that 'language [which consists only of differences] is not a function of the speaking subject':^[11]

It confirms that the subject, and first of all the conscious and speaking subject, depends upon the system of differences and the movement of différance, that the subject is not present, nor above all present to itself before différance, that the subject is constituted only in being divided from itself, in becoming space, in temporizing, in deferral; and it confirms that, as Saussure said, 'language [which consists only of differences] is not a function of the speaking subject.'

Questioned this myth of the presence of meaning in itself ('objective') and/or for itself ('subjective') Derrida will start a long deconstruction of all texts where conceptual oppositions are put to work in the actual construction of meaning and values based on the subordination of the movement of 'différance':^[11]

At the point at which the concept of différance, and the chain attached to it, intervenes, all the conceptual oppositions of metaphysics (signifier/signified; sensible/intelligible; writing/speech; passivity/activity; etc.)—to the extent that they ultimately refer to the presence of something present (for example, in the form of the identity of the subject who is present for all his operations, present beneath every accident or event, self-present in its 'living speech,' in its enunciations, in the present objects and acts of its language, etc.)- become non pertinent. They all amount, at one moment or another, to a subordination of the movement of différance in favor of the presence of a value or a meaning supposedly antecedent to différance, more original than it, exceeding and governing it in the last analysis. This is still the presence of what we called above the 'transcendental signified.'

But, as Derrida also points out, these relations with other terms express not only meaning but also values. The way elemental oppositions are put to work in all texts it is not only a theoretical operation but also a practical option.The first task of deconstruction, starting with philosophy and afterwards revealing it operating in literary texts, juridical texts, etc., would be to overturn these oppositions:^[13]

On the one hand, we must traverse a phase of overturning. To do justice to this necessity is to recognize that in a classical philosophical opposition we are not dealing with the peaceful coexistence of a vis-a-vis, but rather with a violent hierarchy. One of the two terms governs the other (axiologically, logically, etc.), or has the upper hand.

To deconstruct the opposition, first of all, is to overturn the hierarchy at a given moment. To overlook this phase of overturning is to forget the conflictual and subordinating structure of opposition.

It is not that the final task of deconstruction is to surpass all oppositions, because they are structurally necessary to produce sense. They simply cannot be suspended once and for all. But this does not obviate their need to be analyzed and criticized in all its manifestations, showing the way these oppositions, logical and axiological, are at work in all discourse for it to be able to produce meaning and values.^[14]

Illustration[edit]

For example, the word 'house' derives its meaning more as a function of how it differs from 'shed', 'mansion', 'hotel', 'building', etc. (Form of Content, which Louis Hjelmslev distinguished from Form of Expression) than how the word 'house' may be tied to a certain image of a traditional house (i.e. the relationship between signifier and signified) with each term being established in reciprocal determination with the other terms than by an ostensive description or definition.

When can we talk about a 'house' or a 'mansion' or a 'shed'? The same can be said about verbs, in all the world languages: when should we stop saying 'walk' and start saying 'run'? The same happens, of course, with adjectives: when must we stop saying 'yellow' and start saying 'orange', or stop defining as 'black' and start saying 'white', or 'rich' and 'poor', 'entrepreneur' and 'worker', 'civilized' and 'primitive', 'man' and 'animal', 'beast' and 'sovereign', 'christian' and 'pagan', or 'beautiful' and start saying 'ugly', or 'bad' and start saying 'good', or 'truth' and start saying 'false', 'determined' and 'free'? Or 'in' and 'out', 'here' and 'there', 'now' and 'then', 'past' and 'present' and 'future' and 'eternal'? Not only are the topological differences between the words relevant here, but the differentials between what is signified is also covered by différance. Deferral also comes into play, as the words that occur following 'house' or 'white' in any expression will revise the meaning of that word, sometimes dramatically so. This is true not only with syntagmatic succession in relation with paradigmatic simultaneity, but also, in a broader sense, between diachronic succession in History related with synchronic simultaneity inside a 'system of distinct signs'.

Thus, complete meaning is always 'differential' and postponed in language; there is never a moment when meaning is complete and total. A simple example would consist of looking up a given word in a dictionary, then proceeding to look up the words found in that word's definition, etc., also comparing with older dictionaries from different periods in time, and such a process would never end.

This is also true with all ontological oppositions and its many declensions, not only in philosophy as in human sciences in general, cultural studies, theory of Law, et cetera. For example: the intelligible and the sensible, the spontaneous and the receptive, autonomy and heteronomy, the empirical and the transcendental, immanent and transcendent, as the interior and exterior, or the founded and the founder, normal and abnormal, phonetic and writing, analysis and synthesis, the literal sense and figurative meaning in language, reason and madness in psychoanalysis, the masculine and feminine in gender theory, man and animal in ecology, the beast and the sovereign in the political field, theory and practice as distinct dominions of thought itself. In all speeches in fact (and by right) we can make clear how they were dramatized, how the cleavages were made during the centuries, each author giving it different centers and establishing different hierarchies between the terms in the opposition.

Paradox[edit]

It may seem contradictory to suggest that différance is neither a word nor a concept. The difference itself between words cannot only be another word. If that is the case then différance appeals to ontology, creating an even bigger problem. So différance is either an appeal to an infinite mystery (similar to God in theology) or becomes empty of any and all meaning and is thus rendered superfluous.

The web of language[edit]

We reside, according to this philosophy, in a web of language, or at least one of interpretation, that has been laid down by tradition and which shifts each time we hear or read an utterance—even if it is the same utterance. Différance and deconstruction are attempts to understand this web of language, to search, in Derrida's words, for the 'other of language'.^[15] This 'other of language' is close to what Anglophone Philosophy calls the Reference of a word. There is a deferment of meaning with each act of re-reading. There is a difference of readings with each re-reading. In Derrida's words, 'there is nothing outside the [con]text' of a word's use and its place in the lexicon. Text, in Derrida's parlance, refers to context and includes all about the 'real-life' situation of the speech/text (cf. speech act theory).

Temporal delay[edit]

For Derrida, the relationship between the Signifier and the Signified is not understood to be exactly like Saussure's. For Derrida, there was a deferral, a continual and indefinite postponement as the Signified can never be achieved. The formation of the linguistic sign is marked by movement, and is not static. The easiest way to understand this is to imagine Saussure's model as a two dimensional plane, where each signified is separated due to the difference in its sound image. (If two sound-images are exactly alike, one could not distinguish between the two.) Each signifier then would be a particular point. Derrida adds a third dimension, time. Now, the act of formation is accounted for. This is not to say that there is no relationship between the two. However, Derrida felt that the old model focused too heavily on the signifier, rather than on utterance and occurrence. The Signifier and the Signified are severed completely and irrevocably.

Example of word introduction[edit]

An example of this effect occurred in England during the Renaissance, when oranges began to be imported from the Mediterranean. Yellow and red came to be differentiated from a new colour term, 'orange'. What was the meaning of these words before 1600? – What is their meaning afterwards? Such effects go on often in the use of language and frequently this effect forms the basis of language/meaning. Such changes of meaning are also often centres of political violence, as is apparent in the differences invested in male/female, master/slave, citizen/foreigner etc. Derrida seeks to modulate and question these 'violent hierarchies' through deconstruction.

Perhaps it is a misconception that différance seeks contradictory meanings. It does not necessarily do so. It can, but what it usually describes is the re-experience, the re-arrival of the moment of reading. Roland Barthes remarked that 'those who fail to reread are obliged to read the same story everywhere'.^[16] This wry comment summarizes the phenomenon of different experience for each iteration.

We are discussing just one text—every text. No distinction is necessarily made between texts in this 'basic' level. The difference/deferral can be between one text and itself, or between two texts; this is the crucial distinction between traditional perspectives and deconstruction.

Deconstruction and the history of philosophy[edit]

Derrida's neographism (rather than neologism because 'neologism' would propose a logos, a metaphysical category; and (more simply) because, when uttered in French, 'différance' is indistinguishable from 'difference'—it is thus only a graphical modification, having nothing to do with a spoken logos) is, of course, not just an attempt at linguistics or to discuss written texts and how they are read. It is, most importantly, an attempt to escape the history of metaphysics; a history that has always prioritised certain concepts, e.g., those of substance, essence, soul, spirit (idealism), matter (realism), becoming, freedom, sense-experience, language, science etc. All such ideas imply self-presence and totality. Différance, instead, focuses on the play of presence and absence, and, in effecting a concentration of certain thinking, Derrida takes on board the thought of Freud's unconscious (the trace), Heidegger's destruction of ontotheology, Nietzsche's play of forces, and Bataille's notion of sacrifice in contrast to Hegel's Aufheben.

Différance is not only irreducible to any ontological or theological—ontotheological—reappropriation, but as the very opening of the space in which ontotheology—philosophy—produces its system and its history, it includes ontotheology, inscribing it and exceeding it without return.^[17]

Yet he does not approach this absence and loss with the nostalgia that marks Heidegger's attempt to uncover some original truths beneath the accretions of a false metaphysics that have accumulated since Socrates. Rather it is with the moods of play and affirmation that Derrida approaches the issue.

However, Derrida himself never claimed to have escaped from the metaphysics with what he has done. To the contrary, he criticises others for claiming to have demolished metaphysics thoroughly.

Negative theology[edit]

Derrida's non-concept of différance, resembles, but is not, negative theology, an attempt to present a tacit metaphysics without pointing to any existent essence as the first cause or transcendental signified. Following his presentation of his paper 'Différance' in 1968, Derrida was faced with an annoyed participant who said, 'It [différance] is the source of everything and one cannot know it: it is the God of negative theology.' Derrida's answer was, 'It is and it is not.'^[18]

In contrast to negative theology, which posits something supereminent and yet concealed and ineffable, différance is not quite transcendental, never quite 'real', as it is always and already deferred from being made present. As John Caputo writes, 'Différance is but a quasi-transcendental anteriority, not a supereminent, transcendental ulteriority.'^[19] The differences and deferrings of différance, Derrida points out, are not merely ideal, they are not inscribed in the contours of the brain nor do they fall from the sky, the closest approximation would be to consider them as historical, that is, if the word history itself did not mean what it does, the airbrushing speech of the victor/vanquished.

Derrida has shown an interest in negative or apophatic theology, one of his most important works on the topic being his essay 'Sauf le nom'.^[20]

Life and technics[edit]

In Of Grammatology, Derrida states that grammatology is not a 'science of man' because it is concerned with the question of 'the name of man.' This leads Derrida into a consideration of the work of André Leroi-Gourhan, and in particular his concepts of 'program,' 'exteriorisation,' and 'liberation of memory.' Derrida writes: 'Leroi-Gourhan no longer describes the unity of man and the human adventure thus by the simple possibility of the graphie in general; rather as a stage or an articulation in the history of life—of what I have called différance—as the history of the grammè.'^[21] Derrida thus explicitly refers the term différance to life, and in particular to life as the history of inscription and retention, whether this is genetic or technological (from writing to 'electronic card indexes'). And thus grammatology is not a science of man because it deconstructs any anthropocentrism, in the sense that the inscription in question falls on both sides of the divide human/non-human.

Yet, in the article 'Différance', Derrida refers différance not to physis, that is, life, but to 'all the others of physis—tekhnè, nomos, thesis, society, freedom, history, mind, etc.—as physis differed and deferred, or as physis differing and deferring.'^[22]Bernard Stiegler argues in his book, Technics and Time, 1, that this represents a hesitation in Derrida: 'Now phusis as life was already différance. There is an indecision, a passage remaining to be thought. At issue is the specificity of the temporality of life in which life is inscription in the nonliving, spacing, temporalisation, differentiation, and deferral by, of and in the nonliving, in the dead.'^[23] What this suggests to Stiegler is that grammatology—a logic of the grammè—must be supplemented with a history of grammatisation, a history of all the forms and techniques of inscription, from genetics to technics, each stage of which will be found to possess its own logic. Only in this way can différance be thought as the differing and deferral of life (life as the emergence of a difference from non-life, specifically as the deferral of entropy), and as the difference fromphysis through which the human must inevitably be defined (the human as the inauguration of another memory, neither the memory of genetics nor that of the individual, but rather a memory consisting in 'inscription in the nonliving,' that is, technical memory).

Notes[edit]

1. ^'The economy of this writing is a regulated relationship between that which exceeds and the exceeded totality: the différance of the absolute excess.' (Derrida, J., 1978. Cogito and the History of Madness. From Writing and Difference. Trans. A. Bass. London & New York: Routledge. p. 75.) Schultz and Fried in their vast bibliography of Derrida's work cite this sentence as where 'JD introduces différance' for the first time. (Schultz, W.R. & Fried, L.B., 1992. Jacques Derrida Bibliography. London & New York: Garland. p. 12.)
2. ^See Speech and Phenomena and other essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs, trans. David B. Allison (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 'Différance'. Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago & London: Chicago University Press, 1982) and Positions, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1971).
3. ^'Différance', Margins of Philosophy, p. 5.
4. ^Norris, Christopher (2002). Deconstruction : theory and practice (3. ed.). London: Routledge. p. 32. ISBN9780415280105.
5. ^Royle, Nicholas (2004) Jacques Derrida, pp. 62–63
6. ^Derrida and Ferraris (1997) p.76

   I take great interest in questions of language and rhetoric, and I think they deserve enormous consideration; but there is a point where the authority of final jurisdiction is neither rhetorical nor linguistic, nor even discursive. The notion of trace or of text is introduced to mark the limits of the linguistic turn. This is one more reason why I prefer to speak of 'mark' rather than of language. In the first place the mark is not anthropological; it is prelinguistic; it is the possibility of language, and it is every where there is a relation to another thing or relation to an other. For such relations, the mark has no need of language.

7. ^Saussure, Ferdinand de (1916 [trans. 1959]). Course in General Linguistics. New York: New York Philosophical Library. pp. 121–22.Check date values in: |year= (help)
8. ^Cf. Jacques Derrida, 'Interview with Julia Kristeva' in 'Positions' (The University of Chicago Press, 1981), pp. 21

   Although Saussure recognized the necessity of putting the phonic substance between brackets ('What is essential in language, we shall see, is foreign to the phonic character of the linguistic sign' [p. 21]. 'In its essence it [the linguistic signifier] is not at all phonic' [p. 164]), Saussure, for essential, and essentially metaphysical, reasons had to privilege speech, everything that links the sign to phone. He also speaks of the 'natural link' between thought and voice, meaning and sound (p. 46). He even speaks of 'thought-sound' (p. 156). I have attempted elsewhere to show what is traditional in such a gesture, and to what necessities it submits. In any event, it winds up contradicting the most interesting critical motive of the Course, making of linguistics the regulatory model, the 'pattern' for a general semiology of which it was to be, by all rights and theoretically, only a part. The theme of the arbitrary, thus, is turned away from its most fruitful paths (formalization) toward a hierarchizing teleology: 'Thus it can be said that entirely arbitrary signs realize better than any others the ideal of the semiological process; this is why language, the most complex and most widespread of the systems of expression, is also the most characteristic one of them all; in this sense linguistics can become the general pattern for all semiology, even though language is only a particular system' (p. 101). One finds exactly the same gesture and the same concepts in Hegel. The contradiction between these two moments of the Course is also marked by Saussure's recognizing elsewhere that 'it is not spoken language that is natural to man, but the faculty of constituting a language, that is, a system of distinct signs ... ,' that is, the possibility of the code and of articulation, independent of any substance, for example, phonic substance.

9. ^Cf. Jacques Derrida, 'Interview with Julia Kristeva' in 'Positions' (The University of Chicago Press, 1981), pp. 21
10. ^Cf. Jacques Derrida, 'Interview with Julia Kristeva' in 'Positions' (The University of Chicago Press, 1981), pp. 28–30

    It is also the becoming-space of the spoken chain—which has been called temporal or linear; a becoming-space which makes possible both writing and every correspondence between speech and writing, every passage from one to the other.

    The activity or productivity connoted by the a of différance refers to the generative movement in the play of differences. The latter are neither fallen from the sky nor inscribed once and for all in a closed system, a static structure that a synchronic and taxonomic operation could exhaust. Differences are the effects of transformations, and from this vantage the theme of différance is incompatible with the static, synchronic, taxonomic, ahistoric motifs in the concept of structure.

11. ^ ^abcCf. Jacques Derrida, 'Interview with Julia Kristeva' in 'Positions' (The University of Chicago Press, 1981), pp. 28–30
12. ^Burke, Patrick (1997). 'The Flesh as Urpräsentierbarkeit in the Interrogative: The Absence of a Question in Derrida'. In Dillon, M. C. (ed.). Ecart & Différance: Merleau-Ponty and Derrida on Seeing and Writing. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International. p. 60. Derrida says that différance is removed from every possible mode of presence, like the unconscious of Freud, the force in Nietzsche, the Other in Levinas. So the question of différance must yield to the différance of the question and thus can never be asked, is forever absent.
13. ^Cf. Jacques Derrida, 'Interview with Jean-Louis Houdebine and Guy Scarpetta,' in 'Positions' (The University of Chicago Press, 1981), pp. 42–44
14. ^Cf. Jacques Derrida, 'Interview with Jean-Louis Houdebine and Guy Scarpetta,' in 'Positions' (The University of Chicago Press, 1981), p. 42

    When I say that this phase is necessary, the word phase is perhaps not the most rigorous one. It is not a question of a chronological phase, a given moment, or a page that one day simply will be turned, in order to go on to other things. The necessity of this phase is structural; it is the necessity of an interminable analysis: the hierarchy of dual oppositions always reestablishes itself. Unlike those authors whose death does not await their demise, the time for overturning is never a dead letter.

15. ^Richard Kearney, Dialogues with Contemporary Thinkers, Manchester: MUP, 1984
16. ^Barthes, Roland. S/Z. Trans. by Richard Miller. New York: Hill and Wang, 1974, pp. 15–6.
17. ^'Différance', Margins of Philosophy, p.6.
18. ^Caputo, John. The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997, p. 2.
19. ^Caputo, Prayers and Tears, p. 3.
20. ^Derrida, Jacques. 'Sauf le nom'. On the Name. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995.
21. ^Derrida, Jacques. Of Grammatology, Baltimore & London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998, p. 84.
22. ^Derrida, Jacques. 'Différance', Margins of Philosophy, Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 1982, p. 17.
23. ^Stiegler, Bernard. Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus, Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp. 139–40.

References[edit]

• 'Speech and Phenomena' and other essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs, trans. David B. Allison (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973).
• Of Grammatology (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998, corrected edition).

External links[edit]

• Full text of Différance chapter, translated by Alan Bass, from Margins of Philosophy pp. 3–27 (Stanford University)